THE SPIRIT OF THE OFFENSIVE—II
By Lieutenant Commander H. H. Frost, U. S. Navy
VII. The Influence of the Commander
There have been innumerable instances where a single commander has inspired his men with the offensive spirit. Mr. Wells gives Alexander no credit, but it is a fact that of all his advisers, only Parmenio supported him in his plan to attack the Persian Empire, and throughout the numerous campaigns which followed, it was the driving force of their king which made the Macedonians eager for battle.
When Alcibiades rejoined the Athenians, they were being defeated everywhere by the Spartans and their fortunes were at their lowest ebb. Alcibiades took command of a dispirited fleet and infused such fighting spirit into it that victory after victory was won in rapid succession and Athens again regained the upper hand.
Lucullus made his wonderful march through Asia Minor and Armenia with a mere handful of men, whom, when he had assumed command, he found in open mutiny.
Sertorius by his resolute character made Spanish barbarians into such soldiers that he won a series of victories over the veteran Roman legions, commanded by Pompey the Great.
Gustavus, even before any of his victories, had inspired his army with the spirit of the offensive, and after he fell at Lutzen, which battle had really decided the war, the Swedes lacked the resolution to march forward and win the fruits of the victory, but again fell back to the defensive.
In 1796, the French Army of Italy was in a wretched condition, lacking supplies and the desire to fight, and content with remaining on the defensive and holding on to their present positions. An unknown soldier of twenty-seven who had gained the command by pure favoritism, created the most remarkable transformation in history and soon the soldiers were mad with enthusiasm and eager to be led against the superior numbers of the enemy. Bonaparte repeated this feat when upon his return from Egypt he raised France from the depths of despair and revived the old spirit of the Republic.
In the wars of the French Republic the Austrian generals and troops were, with the exception of Archduke Charles, noted for the defensive attitude they assumed. This was probably due to the fact that all their plans were drawn up by the Aulic Council and Vienna, and no freedom of action was allowed the commanders in the field. When Suvorof took over the command of the combined Austrian and Russian armies, he immediately changed both the manner in which the plans for the armies were made and the spirit with which they were imbued. The Aulic Council having presented him with a plan of campaign which was to end with the arrival of the armies at the river Adda, the fiery old general drew a cross over the paper and wrote at the bottom, "The plan will begin with the passage of the Adda and will end as God pleases." With such a leader it was easy for the Austrians to regain all Italy.
When Grant assumed the command of all the federal armies, Sherman wrote a letter to him, in which he showed the reason for Grant's successes in the West: "When you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubts, no reserves; and I tell you, it was this that made us act with confidence."
General Lee was often forced by his inferior numbers to act on the defensive, and it was only his inspiring personality which kept the fighting spirit of his armies intact to the very end of the war. A certain little scene after the Battle of Antietam must have had a remarkable influence on his troops. In accordance with his custom the general asked each of his division commanders to state the actual situation in his part of the line and to give his opinion as to the best plan for the future. All the reports agreed; the troops were exhausted; the losses had been terrible; the federal forces were overwhelmingly superior and had fought better than ever before; the situation of the army with a great river at its back was very dangerous. All agreed that a retreat across the Potomac during the night was necessary to save the army. Even Jackson, the originator of the most daring plans, was forced to indorse the opinions of the other generals.
After listening to all the opinions of his officers, the general said in his calm voice: "Gentlemen, we will not cross the Potomac tonight. You will go to your respective commands, strengthen your lines; send two officers from each brigade toward the ford to collect your stragglers and get them up. Many have come in. I have had the proper steps taken to collect the men who are in the rear. If McClellan wants to fight in the morning, I will give him battle again."
At Port Arthur the arrival of Admiral Makaroff instilled a fighting spirit in the Russian Fleet based there; after he was killed, the Russians went back to their passive defensive.
VIII. The Necessity of Maintaining the Spirit of the Offensive by Winning Victories
A spirit of the offensive developed by the various measures which have been described must be maintained during war by victories in the field. There are only a few instances in history where the spirit of a nation has remained intact after a series of defeats. Thus Rome, after the great victories of Pyrrhus, would not consent to a peace on any terms as long as an enemy remained on Roman soil. In a similar way was their spirit maintained after the great victories of Hannibal, but in this case they were compelled to revert to a limited offensive for a number of years. Another instance of constancy in defeat was shown by the Russians in 1812; their defeat at Borodino did not take away their hopes of victory in the war, but even in this case, it will be noted that they gave Napoleon no further chance to catch them in the open field.
In all his early campaigns Alexander had been uniformly victorious, both in battle and siege. But at Arbela he wished to win a battle which would end the resistance of the Persians once for all. The evening before the battle he was urged to make a night attack, but declined, saying that he would not steal a victory. He did not do this out of chivalry, but of calculated policy. He wanted a victory in daylight in the open field, where his enemy would have all the conditions in his favor, so that he could definitely prove to both his own men and the enemy that the Persians could not stand up to Macedonians, and that there was no use for the enemy to continue the war further.
Caesar during the Gallic Wars is said to have taken eight hundred towns by storm, conquered three hundred states, and defeated over three million men in battle. His soldiers believed that they were invincible. "He was," as Plutarch says, "so much master of the good-will and hearty service of his soldiers, that those who in other expeditions were but ordinary men, displayed a courage past defeating or withstanding when they went upon any danger where Caesar's glory was concerned."
The Battle of the Yalu was the decisive battle of the Russo-Japanese War in that it proved to the Japanese that they could defeat European soldiers in the open field.
IX. The Effect of Exhaustion
Even though there may be every external influence favoring the building up of a fighting spirit, there is one internal influence which may break down this spirit in time. This is the physical and mental exhaustion to which great leaders, and also veteran troops, are often subject. In 1805 Napoleon said: "There is only one time in life for war. I shall be good for six years longer. After that I must pull myself up." In 1809 his first failings became apparent and by 1812 he was no longer his old self. There is nothing remarkable in this when we remember that he usually went to bed at midnight and commenced work again at 3 a.m.
Suvorof said in 1791: "The time is short, the end approaches, six years and the juice will be squeezed out of the lemon." His last campaign was in 1799.
Hindenburg writes: "Many a time has the soldier's calling exhausted strong characters, and that surprisingly quickly. The fine intellect and resolute will of one year give place to the sterile imaginings and faint heart of the next. That is perhaps the tragedy of military greatness."
As Napoleon signed his abdication at Fontainebleau, he exclaimed bitterly to his marshals and generals: "You want repose, have it then! Alas! You do not know how many chagrins and dangers await you on your beds of down. A few years of this peace, for which you are going to pay so dearly, will kill a greater number of you than war, the most desperate war."
There are numerous examples of the exhaustion of military leaders, and in fact also statesmen, during the World War. It is believed to be a fact that no cabinet minister or commander-in-chief on land or sea of a European country served in these posts continuously throughout the war.
Exhaustion in war is not confined only to commanders, but also to veteran troops and seamen of the highest grade. The soldiers of Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon practically mutinied on several occasions, because they wished to end the privations and dangers to which they were continually exposed, and incidentally to enjoy the riches they had won. In this war many armies of brave and veteran troops were so worn out by fighting that, while willing to fight a while longer on the defensive, they could not be induced to attack. Their offensive spirit had been broken. In such cases it will require every effort to build up the morale of the troops. The return of the Germans to the offensive in March, 1918, after having been on the defensive for years is a remarkable instance of the rebuilding of an offensive spirit. The German leaders deserve the greatest credit for this unusual accomplishment.
X. The Influence of the Principle of Self-Preservation
Self-preservation is the first law of nature. It tends to induce a defensive spirit, rather than that of the offensive. Xenophon tried to combat this tendency when he said, "Whoever of you desires to preserve his life, let him strive to conquer."
In general, a nation will make greater efforts to put forth its full strength when it is fighting on its home soil than when it is carrying the war into the enemy's country. In the latter case, our armies are apparently successfully conducting their campaign and no particular effort seems necessary; in the first case, however, the entire nation realizes the importance of putting forth its maximum strength. It will be noted that the courses of most wars, and the World War in particular, have been marked by startling changes in fortune. This is caused by the fact that each nation, as its situation becomes desperate, makes extraordinary efforts to rectify it; then, as soon as the tide changes in its favor, the people become overconfident, efforts are relaxed, and the enemy is given a chance to rally.
In accordance with this principle we might have expected the Germans to make another great effort to hold the Western Front in November, 1918; their chances of holding the front would have been increased because there would have been great difficulty for the Allied leaders to induce their people to continue the war after they knew the Germans wanted peace. The possibility of the Germans making a renewed stand was, in this case, decreased by the utter breakdown of their morale and the fact that the United States was as yet unexhausted by war and was continually pouring fresh troops into the battle.
In addition to this form of self-preservation, there is also frequently an improper desire to preserve our ships and men; this prevents the running of risks and tends to react against the spirit of the offensive. In the war it was a favorite form of propaganda to accuse the German commanders of heartlessly sending their troops to be mowed down by thousands by our fire. It was therefore somewhat of a shock to us to find that after the war the losses of the Germans were very much less than those of our allies. Napoleon's attitude when he said, "what are a million men to me," usually resulted in smaller losses than if he had acted with the greatest caution and had attempted to save the lives of his men and not win battles.
XI. The Development of an Organization Suited to the Application of the Offensive Spirit
Having set forth some methods by which the spirit of the offensive may be built up and maintained in a military or naval organization, it remains to see how the organization itself should be built up so that the maximum use can be made of the spirit of the offensive.
The spirit of the offensive is not a static force; it can be applied only with motion. Mobility is therefore a requisite. There are four forces which tend to oppose the movement of fleets and armies:
- The difficulty of coming to a definite decision, particularly when there is no information upon which to base it.
- The inertia which must be overcome to put a fleet or army in motion.
- The internal friction between the parts of the organization.
- The external friction between the organization and the outside elements.
XII. Delay in Making Decisions
To carry out an offensive movement it is necessary not to follow the lead of an enemy when we are forced to take action, but to make a definite and original decision of our own to make the enemy follow our lead. This decision must be based on a consideration of the information available, which in war is usually inaccurate, always vague and sometimes conflicting.
There is no better example of inaccurate information than the report made by the officer of the British sloop Wasp, who daringly entered Cadiz in a Portuguese boat, to the effect that Villeneuve's fleet was in that port, when it actually had left seventeen days before and was then in mid-ocean. The arrival of this information completely changed the ideas of Lord Barham in the Admiralty. In fact, so much inaccurate information was received as to Villeneuve, that it was finally admitted that nobody knew where he was, but that it was suspected he had gone to India.
Plutarch cites a case of vague and conflicting information in describing the conditions in Rome when Caesar was advancing on that city: "Then again, it was impossible to have any good intelligence of the enemy; for what each man heard by chance upon a flying rumor, he would report for truth, and exclaim against Pompey if he did not believe it." The numerous and entirely incorrect reports of German submarines and bases in the Western Atlantic is another similar case. The conflicting information received by Jellicoe as he was making his approach at Jutland is an instance as regards tactics, as distinct from strategy.
Not many men have the power of making a definite decision even when all the facts are in their possession. It is manifestly much more difficult when the facts themselves have to be constructed and guessed at. Caesar was a general who had a reputation for boldness and quickness in making decisions. But even he hesitated a long time before making his fateful decision to cross the Rubicon. "He checked his course," says Plutarch, "and ordered a halt, while he revolved with himself, and often changed his opinion one way and the other, without speaking one word. At last in a sort of passion, casting aside calculation, and abandoning himself to what might come, and using the proverb frequently in their mouths who enter upon dangerous and bold attempts, 'The die is cast,' with these words he took the river."
Hindenburg describes the doubts which assailed him and his staff during the Battle of Tannenburg: "The crisis of the battle now approached. One question forced itself upon us. How would the decision develop if these mighty movements and the enemy's superiority in numbers delayed the decision for days? Is it surprising that misgivings filled many a heart, that firm resolution began to yield to vacillation, and that doubts crept in where a clear vision had hitherto prevailed? Would it not be wiser to strengthen our line against Samsonoff? Was it not better to abandon the idea of destroying the Narew Army in order to ensure ourselves against destruction? We overcame the inward crisis, adhered to our original intention, and turned in full strength to effect its realization by attack. So the order was issued for our right wing to advance straight on Neidenburg, and the left enveloping wing to take up its position at 4 a.m. and intervene with the greatest energy."
In originality and boldness of decision our people probably surpass all others. With these native qualities to build on, our officers should be the most bold and self-reliant in the world. In order to insure that our leaders in war will have these qualities we should:
- Train all officers in making decision in tactical games and chart maneuvers.
- Continue this training in tactical and strategic problems carried out by the fleet.
- Encourage flag and commanding officers to act with decision in their everyday work, and to this end allow them liberal freedom of action.
- Select only men of known decision and resolution for flag officers afloat, and give these qualities first priority in their selection.
- Surround these officers with loyal and resolute staff officers who will support them in their decisions.
XIII. Inertia and Friction
A great amount of inertia must be overcome to get a large naval or military force in motion. The mobilization of an army is one of the greatest tasks on earth. The movement of a fleet, while less difficult, involves many factors, where driving force is necessary to overcome the inertia and overcome it quickly. Some of these factors are: the writing of orders, their coding, transmission and decoding, the delays caused by improper interpretation of the orders, the preparation of ships for sea, including possibly their fueling and provisioning, the sweeping of channels for mines, the detail of air and surface craft for screening, the formation of scouting Hues in advance of the fleet, and the various other necessary measures.
In Sherman and His Campaigns a description is given of the federal armies at the beginning of the Civil War: "It was purely chance whether any movement ordered from headquarters would be made at all; a rare chance whether it would be made at the time designated in orders; a miraculous chance if it were made exactly as ordered." The inertia to be overcome in this case would be very great.
A sharp contrast with this is afforded by the remarkable smoothness with which the Grand Fleet was operated. The system and methods in carrying out their sweeps in the North Sea were the gradual evolution of four years of war and had been reduced to a definite system. The entire Grand Fleet could get to sea well within four hours, in which time all the necessary protective measures would have been completed. It is well worth while to study with care the signals sent by the units of the Grand Fleet while they were leaving port for the cruise which culminated in the Battle of Jutland.
When the fleet is in motion the factors which produce inertia now could be considered to cause internal friction which tends to slow down the advance of the fleet. To these factors must be added the numerous casualties, particularly in the engineering department, which are so frequent in naval warfare. Note for instance the great amount of condenser trouble experienced by the battleships of the Grand Fleet during the first months of the war, when the steaming was more continuous than had been expected. Another form of internal friction is caused by the lack of co-operation between subordinate commanders and by disloyalty to the commander-in-chief and the general plan. It is reported that these conditions existed in the German Army on the Western Front in 1914, and if such was the case, it is probable that they had much to do with the failure of the Germans.
In addition to the internal friction there is what might be called external friction. This is present in three forms. The first is the delay and damage caused by unfavorable weather conditions; during the war there were numerous examples of groundings, collisions, and of injury caused by heavy weather, and of delays caused by storms, fogs, and currents. The second form is caused by enemy action. It consists of damage caused by enemy mines and delays made necessary by making detours around waters known to be mined by the enemy; of delays caused by zigzagging and by enemy torpedo hits; and of other losses caused by enemy action and the various counter-measures taken when contacts with enemy forces are reported.
The third form of external friction may be summed up in the word logistics. This usually decreases the mobility of a fleet and often prevents its advance altogether, when it must operate from positions where fuel storage and dry-docking facilities have not been established during peace. The repair facilities of the fleet are now so extensive that such facilities ashore in the theatre of operations are not so essential as they formerly were.
Thus far we have considered only strategical mobility. Tactical mobility is equally important. The High Seas Fleet at Jutland showed such mobility to a degree never before attained. This was due to the excellence of the Germans in communications, to their perfect indoctrination in the method of fighting a fleet action, and to their long years of tactical training before the war. The following are some methods by which the effects of inertia and friction may be reduced and strategical and tactical mobility gained:
- The development of war instructions and doctrine for all classes of ships. Very considerable progress has been made in the preparation of theoretical instructions, but they have not been sufficiently tested out in actual maneuvers.
- The training of our officers in the application of these instructions, both on the game board and in maneuvers. An excellent start in some forces has been made in this work, but, in general, by far the greater part of this work lies before us. We have a long road to travel before we can approach the High Seas Fleet in tactical mobility.
- The instruction of staff officers in war staff work. Today we are fairly well versed in purely administrative staff work, but know practically nothing of war staff work. The difficulties of the immediate situations consume the time of staff officers and little thought is given to war plans and the methods of using the naval forces in war. In some places, however, a start is being made.
- The continuation of our good work in communications; a specialty should be made of battle communications, and in particular those relating to destroyers, aircraft and submarines.
- Whenever a naval force leaves port for a cruise, orders should be issued as if a state of war existed and all the necessary protective measures should be taken. Tactical and strategical exercises should invariably be carried out en route.
XIV. The Application of the Offensive Spirit in Warfare
Having now considered some of the measures which may be taken to develop the spirit of the offensive, and the means by which mobility may be developed so that we make use of this spirit, it remains to examine the ways and means by which this spirit of the offensive may be applied to actual warfare.
It will be convenient to consider this problem from the viewpoints of both strategy and tactics.
XV. Forms of Offensive Strategic Operations
In strategy the spirit of the offensive may be applied in two ways:
- In an offensive campaign carried on for the purpose of controlling vital lines of communication, taking advantage of every opportunity of forcing a fleet action on the enemy.
- In a limited offensive campaign in which for some good reason, usually a decided inferiority in fighting strength, it is desirable to avoid a fleet action, but in which we carry on intensive and persistent operations with destroyers, submarines, light cruisers, mine-layers, and aircraft to wear down the enemy, and, if he is operating away from his home bases, to attack his communications to such effect that he is compelled to retire from his position. The battle force should be used frequently in operations designed for bringing to action portions of the enemy battle force not greatly superior to ours.
There should be no passively defensive campaign under any conditions.
The first form of campaign might be called that of the "absolute offensive," while the second could be designated as the "limited offensive." The latter would correspond with the French idea of making limited attacks, among which were the two very successful Verdun operations in 1917. Our St. Mihiel offensive might also be put in this class, as distinct from the Meuse-Argonne, which was an absolute offensive.
XVI. The Advantages of Offensive Operations
All offensive operations have two great advantages, which are inherent in them and are present in all cases. They have greater effect in the absolute offensive than in the limited offensive.
The first is the advantage of surprise, which devolves from the fact that we hold the initiative. "We have," said Admiral Bacon, "the enormous advantage of knowing what we are going to do, where we are going to do it, and when." These advantages were never better illustrated than in the action In Heligoland Bight and the attack on Zeebrugge. The advantages cited by Admiral Bacon decided both enterprises in favor of the British.
The second is the great moral advantage which lies on the side of the fleet taking the offensive. This was never so marked as in the naval campaign of 1805, when the French were continually avoiding action and the British seeking it. The German strategical Ideas as to the naval campaign in the North Sea had always been defensive, because they expected that the British would make an Immediate attack on their coast with naval and expeditionary forces. At the beginning of the war the German Fleet was all keyed up for the great naval battle which would result from such an attack; as soon as it became apparent that the British had no Intention of making such an attack, all prospect of a naval battle vanished, because the Germans had no idea of carrying the offensive into British waters. In consequence their enthusiasm waned. "To anyone who experienced It," writes Commander Groos In the official German history, "there can never be forgotten the picture of the outgoing battle cruisers and ships of the first squadron, the decks cleared for action, the officers on the bridge, the men on deck, while the rousing singing of patriotic songs and the cheers of the crews, mingled with those of the population on shore, filled the harbor…Even the day of departure brought disillusion. The battleships anchored in the Jade, and for the time being, fleet, squadron, and cruiser staffs busied themselves primarily with the safeguarding of the German Bight and bases in the river mouths. Very soon military interest was almost exclusively directed to this important, to be sure, but still subordinate and purely defensive task."
For the above two reasons a force acting on the offensive has probably an advantage of twenty per cent over one acting on the limited offensive and forty per cent over one acting passively on the defensive.
XVII. Offensive or Limited Offensive Operations
The first decision to be made in war is to determine whether we can act on the offensive or whether we are compelled to make use of the limited offensive. In this estimate we must give consideration to the inherent advantages which all offensive operations have, but it will be necessary to make an independent estimate in each situation, because sometimes these inherent advantages will be more than counter-balanced by other special factors.
Estimate the relative strength of the opposing forces, considering not only numbers of ships and men, but the quality of the ships and the efficiency of the personnel.
Next determine the relative advantages of the strategic positions occupied by the opposing forces.
Finally make an estimate as to how the relative strength and strategic positions are liable to change in the near future.
In making these comparisons, avoid the error of exaggerating the numbers and efficiency of the enemy, as McClellan did in the peninsula campaign, and as was done so frequently in the World War. Do not credit the enemy with being able to do things you would not consider doing yourself. Do not get the idea of imagining what the enemy can do to you, but consider all the things you can do to him. When after the Battle of Cunaxa, the Persians demanded that the Greeks give up their arms, Theopompus the Athenian replied: "Do not suppose that we shall give up to you the only things of value we possess; but with these in our hands, we shall fight for whatever of value you possess." This doubtless impressed the Persians.
The following four principles may be used as a general guide as to whether the offensive or limited offensive should be used in strategic operations:
- If to a decided inferiority in fighting strength and strategic position is added the fact that the situation is due to change to our advantage, then we are usually justified in using the limited offensive as a temporary expedient.
- If we are practically equal or superior and the situation will improve still more, it must be remembered that an opportunity to engage the enemy in a fleet action happens only once in years and consequently the offensive should be taken and every advantage taken of opportunities to force a fleet action on the enemy.
- If we are superior and the situation is due to change to the advantage of the enemy, then the offensive should be taken with the idea of bringing the enemy to action immediately and even under unfavorable conditions.
- If we are inferior and will probably become still more inferior in the future, and there is no chance of winning the war with land forces or through other agencies, a desperate chance must be taken and the enemy engaged under the best conditions we can obtain.
(To be concluded)