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THE NAVY AND THE INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II, by Robert H. Connery. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1951. 527 pages. $6.00.
Reviewed by Vice Admiral A. G. Noble, U. S. Navy
The reviewer had the unusual experience of serving in a material bureau during the years 1940, 1941, and 1942, and, therefore, has personal knowledge of the situations and influences described by the author in those years. Subsequently, he was, for over three years, a Chief of this same material bureau and from that position has observed and felt the influence of the changes in administrative organization of the Navy Department as discussed by the author, particularly those relating to industrial matters. Finally, as present incumbent of the position of Chief of Naval Material he is confronted with problems similar to those with which the author deals. In view of this experience the reviewer can be charged with a subjective attitude in his appraisal of the merits of the book. Likewise, he may also be credited with being objective in his appraisal in view of the fact that his experience has given him an opportunity to view the several problems from the vantage point of both the coordinator and those who are coordinated.
It is considered that the author has more than fulfilled the desire of Mr. Forrestal in preparing this book to provide an accurate account of the development of the business and administrative organization for the control of the huge material program of the Navy. Of more importance, possibly, is the fact that he has provided a case study of “politics and war,” the military civilian relationships within the organization of the Navy, and the relationships of the Navy to other Government civilian agencies.
The author has employed the techniques of a historian in presenting his facts and historical data. There are woven into the large collection of data, however, some personal conclusions and recommendations which undoubtedly will continue to be the subject of controversy in naval circles for years to come. Naturally, these personal conclusions and recommendations will be apparent only to those who have actual personal knowledge and, other than possibly to give a somewhat inaccurate description of former circumstances, should not detract from the value of the book nor its final worth.
The description of the circumstances relating to the Navy’s material organization prior to World War II, the inadequacies of the staff of the Secretary, and the restrictive authority of the Chief of Naval Operations may be considered correct only in regard to the letter rather than to the spirit. A stranger appraising the Navy organization often fails to grasp the inherent cohesion of the Navy as a whole. The absence of firm authoritative control in the statutory position of the Chief of Naval Operations did not, in fact, prevent the preparation of plans, both for operations and for material, and their coordination. The principal cause of the failure to prepare adequate material plans was the inability to forecast accurately the future and to grasp the immensity of the ultimate material program before the country was virtually deluged by the approaching global war.
ith the recognition of the impending conflict by the Administration and the Congress, the appropriation of funds for the building up of our forces, and the increasing burden caused by superimposing Lend Lease requirements, the administrative organization of our Government, and particularly of the two Services, required tremendous expansions. The granting of additional powers to the Chief Executive and the establishing of numerous emergency agencies outside the framework of the Executive Department presented a conflicting picture of diverse interests and crossed authorities which challenged the abilities of the small trained staff to operate at all.
The organizations within the Navy were neither sufficiently large nor sufficiently trained to meet these abnormal conditions. Particularly, handicapped by the statutory requirements in regard to contracting, the confused thinking of the Congress initially in the passage of Acts making possible the furnishing of facilities to contractors, the authority to negotiate purchases rather than enter contracts through competitive bidding, introduced new circumstances which the previously trained and experienced officials found difficult to master. Into this area of change and turmoil were introduced various prominent businessmen and legal advisers to assist in the expediting of Government business. Change in organization was a natural consequence.
Historically, under the stress and strain of wars, the most drastic changes have been made in the organization of the Navy. Further, the changes which have been made were those concerned primarily with the relationships between civilian and military control. In the evolution of the administrative organization of the Navy “the pendulum swung one way towards civilian control of Naval operations and then the other way with military men exercising wide powers in civilian functions.” Further, “the men who came and went as Bureau Chiefs, Commanders of the Fleet, Chief of Naval Operations, or Secretary of the Navy, have profoundly influenced the course of events.”
Shortly after the outbreak of the World War II in 1939, action was taken to strengthen the staff of the Secretary of the Navy through legislation. On March 13, 1940, a bill was enacted into law which created the post of Under Secretary of the Navy. With the appointment of Mr. Forrestal as the Under Secretary of the Navy, the creation of a strong coordinating agency of the material functions of the Navy began.
The initial problems which confronted the new Under Secretary of the Navy were made most difficult by the so-called “politics of war” during the period of 1940 and 1941. The desire for national security through adequate military strength was offset by the general theory that business as usual could continue. The politics of war conditioned the size and speed of industrial mobilization and the success of the latter determined what material the Navy could have and when it would be available.
The Office of the Secretary was expanded rather rapidly to cope with the administrative problems of coordinating the material program of the Navy—problems which were made more difficult by the temperament of the time. As the staff expanded and coordinating controls were placed into effect, resistance to change was evident from various quarters, particularly by certain Bureaus. Here again the author fails, as do so many not familiar with the statutory organization of the Navy Department, to appreciate that the Chiefs of the several bureaus, by statute, are charged with certain responsibilities. The succeeding changes in organization have not reduced those responsibilities, but have, to a considerable degree, limited or affected the ability of the respective Chiefs of Bureaus to carry out those responsibilities. Accordingly, the Bureaus are frequently charged or criticized as being reactionary in opposing change, whereas, in reality, they are only unwilling to have their ability to function efficiently lessened. This resistance was gradually overcome through compromise or adjustments as the war progressed, and at the end of the war the administrative machinery which had been established to cope with the many material problems was destined to become a permanent part of the organization of the Navy.
One of the most important functions of the staff in the Office of the Secretary was to provide a single point of contact for production, procurement, and material problems within the Navy and with other government agencies. The establishment of effective liaison with the War Production Board and other government agencies involved in mobilizing the industrial strength of the Nation was most important. The growing pains of these agencies created numerous problems within the Navy, but through effective coordination each problem wassolved inits turn.
Interwoven into the description of the changes in the administrative machinery of the Navy is the detailed discussion of the solution of such problems as price control, production scheduling, financing of production, allocation of production capacity, and expansion of facilities. The day to day efforts in breaking bottlenecks in these areas taxed the efforts of all concerned and, in many cases, the solution of the problem resulted in changes in procedures and organization.
Mr. Connery’s book is most timely since many of the problems of World War II have now become current problems. The lessons and experience of World War II can be used as a guide for current actions. The value of experience is not to follow it blindly but to exploit it to the fullest extent.
Mr. Connery has created a just tribute to the work of the late Mr. James V. Forrestal. as well as to the various members of his staff, including Admiral S. M. Robinson, Mr. Struve Hensel and Mr. W. John Kenney. Further, the soundness of the administrative organization and procedures which were developed under the guidance of Mr. Forrestal are now withstanding the acid test of current mobilization efforts.
THE ARMED FORCES OFFICER, published by the Department of Defense. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 1950. 267 pages. $1.50.
Reviewed by Commander John V.
Noel, Jr., U. S. Navy
As stated in the letter of promulgation by Secretary of Defense Marshall: “This manual on leadership has been prepared for use by the Department of Army, the Department of Navy and the Department of Air Force, and is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.” Behind this cryptic statement is an interesting story of collaboration by a group of Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force Officers. There are as many views on leadership as there are on religion, and it is a tribute to that small group of carefully selected, anonymous, officers that they were able to reconcile their personal views and the special problems of their services to produce this excellent manual.
The findings of the Doolittle Board, when made public shortly after World War II, did not, in all cases, reflect credit on the leadership of the Armed Forces. The weak point seemed to be the young officer who was in direct contact with the enlisted men. Particularly in times of great expansion, followed by too rapid demobilization, did the lack of a hard core of professional, well trained, junior officers reveal itself. To help correct this and to indoctrinate the junior officers of all services with the profound responsibilities and obligations of their commissions this book was conceived.
The board of officers from all the services completed their work and the first draft was circulated among the services for comments and approval. Col. S. L. A. Marshall was then retained to put the book into final form. Col. Marshall is the military editor of the Detroit News and has been for years one of the nation’s most influential military critics. A World War I combat officer and a lifelong student of military affairs, Col. Marshall is a soldier’s critic. Of his many books, perhaps Men Against Fire is the best known. In World War II he served as Chief Historian, European Theatre of Operations. Shortly after the Korean War started Col.
Marshall joined a military personnel research project whose findings have not been made public. Those familiar with Col. Marshall’s writings will find his views expressed throughout the Armed Forces Officers, but it must be emphasized that the book is largely the result of the work of many officers representing all the Services.
The Armed Forces Officer is unique in many respects. First of all, as stated in the beginning of Chapter IV: “The main purpose of this book is to stimulate thought and to encourage the young officer to seek truth for, and in, himself.” This lofty objective is the true aim of the teaching of leadership. While a sound basis of professional knowledge, together with an understanding of people and their behavior, is the foundation of officer training, a book such as this is important to help develop the art of leadership.
Another unique feature of the Armed Forces Officer is its positive and logical development of the idea that the profession of arms is an honorable and useful one. It should be an inspiration to all young officers to find in this book an eloquent chapter on the meaning of their commissions. Too often, in these post-war years, has the feeling been expressed by thoughtless or sensational writers that military officers are a narrow, arbitrary, and unproductive lot. These sentiments have not helped the morale of the armed forces.
It would be extraordinary if there were not certain views expressed in the Armed Forces Officer that differed from those of the reader. In the chapter on the men’s moral and physical welfare, for example, there is expressed a direct correlation between physical condition and moral force. “Regarding only the gain to moral power which comes of bodily exercise and physical conditioning, it should be self-evident that the process which builds the muscle must also train and alert the mind.” Without going into all the implications of this statement, it is submitted that it is just not true. No one can question, of course, the value of long road marches in conditioning ground troops for battle. It must be remembered, however, that the officers and men of a submarine or destroyer, for example, usually suffer from lack of exercise yet seem to have their share of moral
force.
Whether or not each reader finds his own pet ideas expressed or finds principles stated to which he can only subscribe with reservations, the fact remains that the Armed Forces Officer is an outstanding contribution to the literature on military leadership. It should be required reading for every young officer.
GENERALS AND POLITICIANS. By Jere Clemens King. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. 244 pages, $3.50.
Reviewed by Colonel George C.
Reinhardt, U. S. Army “Policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, not the reverse. Subordination of the military point of view to the political is therefore essential.”
Dr. King’s thesis, a quotation from Von Clausewitz’ Am Krieg likewise does no violence to’Upton’s Military Policy of the United States. But, while the idea expounded in Generals and Politicians is old, its presentation, a meticulous case history of French military and political leadership (or lack thereof) in the First World War, furnishes detailed evidence, some of it newly discovered, from a major crisis in the history of a great nation.
Mobilizing for the offensive a outrance and a victorious liberation of the lost provinces (Alsace-Lorraine), France had painful memories of administrative extremes in the delicate policy-strategy realm. The Committee of Public Safety’s dictation of tactical matters to field commanders had ruinously hampered French Revolutionary arms despite their epic victory at Valmy which shocked “professional” militarists with the power of “national armies.” The “man on horse-back” bogey, two Napoleons and a Boulanger in 75 years, still frightened parliamentary government.
Thus the problem confronting the French people in 1914 was vastly more complicated than the one inevitably confronting all democracies upon the outbreak of war. Dr. King’s searching, admirably documented study reveals their four years’ groping with a remarkable clarity which could include warnings for present day democratic regimes.
Accepting the general misconception of a brief conflict terminating in an Allied victory, the French parliament essentially abdicated to the military ... in the portly person of General (later first Marshal of the Third Republic) Joseph Jacques Cesaire Joffre. Two hundred members of the adjourned Chamber of Deputies reported for military service “with the fasces of their legislature in their knapsacks.” The cabinet, sole remaining civilian agency of government, Joffre treated in a cavalier manner, his calm unruffled by initial German successes. Warning his subordinate, Gallieni, military governor of Paris, on dealing with the Ministry, he wrote: “In accounts I send them I never make known either the aim of the operations under way or my intentions.” Equally high handedly, though trivial in comparison, he blocked President Poincare’s visit of congratulation to the armies after the victory of the Marne.
As reverses, narrowly escaping disaster, mounted and the bitter struggle dragged out its bloody course in years, elected civilian government nibbled at the authority of Jof- fre’s GQG (Grand Quartier General) through the doubtful medium of “army commissions” and secret committees. By the time Nivelle succeeded Joffre (December, 1916), parliament’s indecisive behavior had obscured, rather than specifically reduced, the responsibility and authority of the high command. Nivelle’s ruinous Chemin des Dames offensive following the bloodletting of Joffre’s inept defense of Verdun, reduced the once mighty French armies to the verge of mutiny.
Generals and politicians, neither without some justification, excoriated each other for the situation. “Military loss of face was soon equalled by the tarnished prestige of civilian politicians; near traitors and defeatists were in the midst of parliament if not of the government itself.” “Through default the power shifted to reside with a figure whose name symbolized the will to victory, Georges Cle- menceau.” .
Wisely weighing, and generally accepting, military advice (General Jean Mordacq, combat commander of the 24th Division, became his personal aid) “The Tiger” formed a triumvirate. He as undisputed First Consul directed policy. Strategy fell to Foch, commander in chief of Allied Armies, and active operations to Petain, commander in chief of the French army. It took the fighting premier months and the menace of Hinden- burg’s offensive (March, 1918) to secure British and American acceptance of his “second consul.” At all times, however, Clemen- ceau made it crystal clear that “strategy” was the servant of his “policy.”
During the dark weeks of spring and early summer as well as in the final drive to victory, Clemenceau bullied and jibed at Foch. In the Allied Supreme War Council he rudely shouted at the C-in-C, “Shut up. It is I who represents France here.” Nevertheless the premier had long appreciated Foch’s military talent, had saved him from retirement upon his loss of command after the unsuccessful Somme battles. In his way, undeniably an ungracious one, Clemenceau supported his military chief, boosting him the while into a vaguely defined Supreme Allied Commander. Foch, in return, despite personal and religious antipathy, served The Tiger loyally. Never by a politician and only once by a soldier was the Tiger of France successfully defied. Even that memorable instance was of a personal nature, General Pershing’s blunt, direct refutation of a Clemenceau allegation of friction between the U. S. commander and Petain.
The lesson, as Dr. King asserts, is clear, however difficult to follow: “The Counsel of perfection for a nation is: able civilian government maintaining national interests by effective diplomacy, closely supported by a capable military willing to remain in their proper place.”
The dictatorship of Clemenceau brought success while that of Joffre had wrought havoc. However, those results are the measure of the men, hot the system. True a meddling interference by the civil government without assumption of responsibility could not possibly succeed. Unity of command is no less vital to a nation at war than to its armies in the field. But whenever democracies, dedicated to the equality of man, accept, even seek out, dictatorships during national emergency, let them select such leaders with deep thought.