Shipboard Manning Reduction—How Few Will Do?
By Captain Frank C. Seitz, Jr.
As the author stands on the bridge of the 188,500-ton tanker in which he serves as master, he does so with the knowledge that he must operate her with only 28 men. Many foreign ships are larger and have even smaller crews. The possibility of a 500,000-ton ship with a crew of 5 sounds preposterous, but that’s the direction world shipping could be heading.
The subject of crew reduction is a controversial one in any maritime group—whether its members are ships’ crews, steamship company operators, union officials, or regulatory bodies. The issue has many ramifications in areas as diverse as job security, ship safety, and world economics.
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Shipboard manning reduction is a recognized worldwide trend. It has had substantial impact on merchant vessels and is under active review by many naval fleets as well. Change is inevitable in the modern world. The question we must ask ourselves is this: should we complacently drift along with the tide of world events until the pressures for change force us to react with too little, too late—or should we recognize trends and initiate leadership
positions in order to manage these changes to our own benefit?
Although this article focuses on merchant vessel manning, there is much common ground with the operation of Navy ships. We do, after all, navigate the same oceans, and to do so safely we need to know what’s happening on board other ships. In fact, it is essential for the Navy commanding officer to understand the operations of today’s superships when he is confronted with a floating island of hundreds of thousands of tons of flammable liquid manned by a handful of men.
The Pressures for Crew Reduction: Whether we like it or not, there is, and will continue to be, a worldwide competitive pressure to reduce vessel operating costs. Even though manning costs have been decreasing in recent years in relation to items such as fuel oil and the capital investment in the ship, manning is still a significant and controllable expenditure. As a result, ship operators will continue to scrutinize all areas of their budgets in order to improve the bottom line.
To get an appreciation of today’s total crew costs, let us examine the various components:
- Base wage
- Overtime wage
- Vacation wage
- Pension contributions
- Medical and welfare benefits
- Shipboard lodging and subsistence
- Standby crew costs
- Transportation expenditures
- Training costs
- Protection and indemnity insurance costs
- Vessel quarters construction and operation cost Base wage and overtime wage are generous today,
yet they generally represent less than 50% of the total cost. Probably the strongest impetus driving the budget-conscious operator into crew reduction is an emotional one. It is the gnawing feeling that crew productivity has not kept pace with the gains in the above list. The operator perceives, rightly or wrongly, that a variety of factors such as changing social mores and attitudes, lagging crew competence with new technology, and ever-increasing labor contract restrictions have combined to produce a crew member who is less productive than before.
Another pressure influencing the operator is the marine automation boom. Centralized control and automation of bridge, engine room, and cargo functions are accomplished facts. Replacing man with machine seems to make so much sense that vendors of this equipment are having a heyday. New equipment will continue to produce some spectacular increases in shipboard operating efficiency. Unfortunately, the rapid momentum of this design trend bas produced some very undesirable side effects which will be discussed later.
Finally, the operator is faced with the age-old problem of how to keep competent personnel at sea. Regardless of the gains made in the previously referred to cost list, the high attrition rate for professional seamen still exists. Many studies have examined this problem in recent years, but the results have by and large been overlooked or ignored, the operator apparently preferring the more expedient route of crew reduction.
The Ramifications of Crew Reduction: There is a story around that has two ships in an English Channel traffic situation. The captain of the privileged vessel is becoming concerned that the burdened ship is not taking proper action to give way. He scans the bridge of the other ship with his binoculars and sees no sign of anyone. He is getting worried now. Suddenly, he spots a dog on the wing of the bridge, barking furiously. Just as quickly, a man pops up on the bridge, and the ship begins her course change to give way. The dog is trained to bark when he sees a ship!
Perhaps the above is a bit of an exaggeration, but there is no question that ill-conceived crew reduction schemes have resulted in some exceptionally inefficient and dangerous ship operations. Before examining specific areas, it is best to remind ourselves that shipboard manpower requirements vary widely with the nature of operations. Clearly, the crew sizes which may be adequate for routine open- sea steaming may not be sufficient to handle the higher manpower demands of coastal confluence maneuvering, port operations, emergencies, and major repairs. Here, then, are the effects of manpower reduction on various shipboard functions:
- Vessel Maintenance.Obviously, fewer people will mean less maintenance performed by a ship’s crew. This includes a decrease in the level of long-term preventive maintenance and an increase in the time required for corrective maintenance.
- Labor-Intense Operations. Port preparations, docking/undocking /lightering, cargo transfer operations, tank cleaning, storing, securing ship for sea, and bridge/engine room maneuvering watch conditions are all examples of operations during which the ship’s crew is fully employed. As the time span required for these operations increases, they generally represent the controlling factors in reduction levels if a ship is to remain self-sustaining.
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Proceedings / October 1981
- Crew Overtime. An increase in the level of crew overtime can be expected in most manning reduction situations, regardless of how well the plans are laid. The situation to be avoided in this case is the dangerous overloading of certain key individuals such as the chief mate and first assistant engineer. Dangerously lopsided work and rest cycles can result in poor decision-making when fatigued, increases in accidents and illnesses, and a higher turnover of key personnel as they become “burned out’’
mentally and physically.
- Housekeeping and Hotel Services. A decrease in the level of general vessel housekeeping about the decks and in the engine room will be seen. Although not critical on the face of it, this does create an atmosphere of sloppiness and disorganization counter to the best interests of any ship's operation. Likewise, crew accommodation and food service are likely to suffer a downgrading in standards or adjustment in styles. Negative influences in these areas can significantly influence crew attitudes and morale.
- Available Replacements. Suffice it to say that smaller crews mean fewer replacements available in the event of illness, injury, or shortage of the remaining crew.
- Automation Side Effects. The recent technology boom has fostered some very remarkable labor-saving systems and will no doubt play a primary role in future crew reduction plans. Unfortunately, present state of the art of shipboard automation has experienced some serious growing pains in the areas of quality control and reliability. Unreliable controls, alarms, and readouts can hardly be considered an advance over reliable manual operation. This unreliability is more acutely felt in an automated system because of the domino effect in equipment failure. The system is generally designed to trip associated equipment off the line in case of failure, further complicating what might have been a relatively simple fault.
This problem of quality control is exacerbated by a widely used method of ship procurement, namely, the construction of a "stock” shipyard model equipped from keel to truck with low bidder gear. I have worked with automated cargo systems which, because of their unreliability, require more personnel to monitor than an equivalent manual system. This penny-wise and pound-foolish approach can hardly be considered progress and most certainly hobbles any crew reduction program. An additional hidden cost to sophisticated but poor quality automation is the expense of transporting service vendors and spare parts to remote parts of the world.
Automation reliability problems notwithstanding, there remains a more subtle undesirable side effect to extensive mechanization. The crew members.
Part of the satisfaction and challenge of serving at sea comes from keeping busy with hands-on work. As men are turned by automation into dial-watchers, boredom and inattentiveness can result.
especially the lower ratings, are frequently turned from doers into dial watchers. This new role leads to boredom and inattentiveness, or worse. The lack of a hands-on operational challenge can rapidly erode a person’s perception of proper job satisfaction and will eventually lead to higher crew turnover. This, of course, is just the opposite of the crew continuity which is required of a reduced-crew, highly automated ship.
- Emergency Response Capability. As crew sizes diminish, so does the ability to cope with large-scale emergencies or multiple emergencies involving fire, collision, grounding, abandon ship, man overboard, tank rescue, medical emergency, anti-pollution, major repair, emergency towing, or heavy weather damage. The problem is compounded in port when crewmen go ashore for a break from the routine and leave the ship with only 50% of an already small complement. The constraints of previously mentioned labor-intensive operations are generally viewed as the controlling factors in crew sizes; however, it is my contention that emergency response capability must be given the first priority in any crew reduction plan. Things can come unglued very rapidly in major emergencies—regardless of the presence of written plans and station bills. Those who must cope with emergencies can rapidly find themselves in the position of requiring all the help they can get.
The capital investment in ships and cargo today is huge, and so is their potential for pollution and hazard to port facilities, life, and limb. The message is clear. We must not be blind-sided in this critical area by an obsession with crew reduction goals.
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- Regulatory Requirements. As can be seen in table
1, most major maritime nations have existing manning regulations. In the case of the United States, the Coast Guard determines minimum manning criteria for inspected vessels, as reflected in the vessel’s certificate of inspection. The Coast Guard is also proposing rules which would establish minimum manning standards for foreign ships calling at U. S. ports. The Marine Safety Committee of IMCO (Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization) is now considering international manning standards. It is having some difficulty in coming to consensus with regard to minimum crew sizes, preferring instead to recommend basic principles on questions such as watch standards. In the meantime, while the agencies are grappling with the issue, we see the emergence of such concepts as the integrated tug-barge whereby the intent of manning regulations is effectively circumvented. Because the propulsion unit is still only a tug boat, the overall vessel can legally operate with a crew of six or seven even though the integrated unit can be the size of a large oceangoing ship. Again, the lesson to be learned here is that we must not allow the momentum of rapidly advancing technology and consequent opportunity for crew reduction to outstrip our capacity for self-government. Large national and international bureaucracies move slowly by nature. If regulations have not caught up with the times, then we
must strive to educate ourselves in the ramifications of our actions so as to act intelligently and responsibly on the issue.
A
|
| Table 1 | Comparison Of Current National Manning Regulations |
| ||||
| u. s. | Canada | Cyprus | Greece | Denmark 1 U. K. | Japan 1 Finland 1 Norway\ Sweden \Nethei | \ands\Singapore\Panama\Liberia\ | |
| • | • | •••• | MM |
| — 1t ••• | • I H F 1 •••• 1 •••• 1 H | F | // F | P O | ••• | |
faster -hief Officer | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 |
| 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1111 ii iiii it | 11 1111 11 1111 |
•id Officer | 1 | I | 1 | 1 |
| 1 1 1 | iiii i | I 1111 |
lfd Officer Isdio Officer | 1 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 1 1 1 | iiii i iiii i | 1 1 1 11 till |
Ratings | 6-9 |
| 7-9 | 6 |
| 7-12 4 6 | 4-5 7-9 6-7 6-9 2-5 | 6-8 |
'n8ine Dept. | S M |
|
| B |
| C | B T D | A |
d'itf Engineer sl Engineer | 1 1 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 |
| 1 1 | 1111 11 1111 11 | 11 1111 1 1111 |
"d Engineer | 1 1 |
| 1 | 1 |
| 1 | till 1 | 1 111 |
'fd Engineer | 1 1 |
|
| 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 I |
%ne Ratings 0-6 0-3 | 1-4 | 3 | 4 |
| 3 | 3-5 8 3-9 2-5 0-5 | 0-9 | |
Reward Ratings |
|
|
| 2 |
|
| 1 | 1 |
|
|
|
|
|
| Key For Manning Criteria |
| |
^ Vessel Size |
|
|
| Vessel Type | Area Of Trade | Engine Ty pel size | ||
• 1000 Gross Tons and Over |
| p | Passenger Ships | H Home Trade | M Motor | |||
•• 1400 Gross Tons and Over |
| o | Other Ships | F Foreign Trade | S Steam | |||
t Under 1600 Gross Tons |
|
|
|
|
| A 1200 HP or Over | ||
*** 1000 Gross Tons and Over |
|
|
|
|
| B 3000 HP or Over | ||
***• 2000 Gross Tons and Over |
|
|
|
|
| C 4000 HP or Over | ||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| D 4000 HP or Over and Automated |
L |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| T 10000 HP or Over (Tanker) |
|
► Crew Attitudes and Morale. Crew attitudes, morale, and political climate can make a profound difference in the performance of any ship—to the point of spelling the difference between success or failure of the operation. If the crew member sees the transfer of more and more of his functions to shore and develops the feeling of not playing an important part in the ship operation decision-making process; sees the general maintenance condition of his ship deteriorating despite the excessive work and overtime he is putting in to catch up; sees a general downgrading of housekeeping, hotel services, and safety conditions in which he works and lives; and perceives no mutual benefit to the sacrifices he is being asked to make, he will react by slacking off or seeking employment elsewhere.
Human resource considerations are vital to the successful implementation of crew reduction programs and are the most frequently overlooked.
► National Defense Considerations. Periods of national emergency or war can impose exceptional operational demands on ships, and their small crews may not have the versatility required of joint naval- merchant operations. Unfortunately, the course of world events is rarely predictable, and the rapid
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Proceedings / October 1981
expansion of a highly technical labor pool decimated by crew reduction schemes may not be possible when needed.
Proper Management of Crew Reduction: There are three basic areas of implementation supports to be drawn upon if a manning reduction is to be successful:
- Vessel Equipment Improvement. Hundreds of advanced ship design ideas are available or under development: integrated navigation systems, cockpit- type bridges, satellite navigation and communication systems, unmanned machinery spaces, automatic gangways, closed circuit television, microprocessors for ship administration, ergonomic design of work intensive areas such as bridge, engine console, locating associated labor intense areas into logical work clusters such as galley/reefer boxes/storerooms, improved interior and exterior hull coating systems, design of accommodations and public spaces for ease of sanitary duties, upgrading vessel safety, and firefighting and antipollution equipment. These are only a few of the ideas which illustrate the potential for proper support of the reduced crew.
Once again, it must be strongly emphasized, to keep this great potential asset from becoming a liability, the gear must be simple to maintain, simple to operate, and capable of years of reliable service in a heavy-duty marine environment.
- Operational Procedure Change. Elimination of certain crew tasks is the first obvious procedural change. Periodic maintenance “riding” crews, shore mooring gangs, cargo relief teams, and the transfer of administrative paperwork to shore are examples of task elimination. As appealing as some of these changes may be, they tend to make a vessel less than self-sustaining and lend themselves more to vessels in dedicated service than to other types of ships. A more versatile approach is the redistribution of crew tasks on board. The first necessary step in this approach is the elimination or diffusion of the traditional and strict shipboard deck/engine/ stewart departmental jurisdictional guidelines. Not only are these rigid departmental divisions inefficient, they also foster rivalries which can substantially interfere with the vessel’s operation. The primary object should be to prevent a situation in which one crew member is overburdened with work while another is idle. The shift toward generalized manning would require considerable cross-training in traditional departmental skills, but early evidence from experiments now in progress indicates that the investment is worthwhile.
- Personnel Resource Improvement. Implicit in the installation of technically sophisticated equipment and advanced design concepts are the training and upgrading of crew professional skills. Equally
important on this new scene is the upgrading of the crew’s management and psychology skills. Management and psychology skills? Silly talk for a seaman, you say. Not really, when you consider that most professional merchant seamen have had a lifetime of technical training and usually zero instruction in human behavior and management techniques. Instruction in the areas of group dynamics and behavior modification, individual needs and motivation, transactional analysis, Pygmalion effect, oral and written communications, personnel counselling, planning and prioritizing are just some of the skills that the new breed of seaman will need if he is to successfully effect new concepts and truly participate in the management of his ship.
Living and working conditions will also become more important than they have been up to now as greater demands are made on the smaller crews confined to long runs, quick port turn-arounds, and the isolation associated with reduced crews on board large ships. A system of incentive bonuses or profit sharing for good vessel performance might also become desirable to instill an atmosphere of mutual benefit on board the ship.
Conclusion: The problem of reduced shipboard manning should be approached with a liberal measure of common sense. It would be rather pointless to reduce the crew on a 35-year-old ship that has trouble keeping up as it is. Even on new construction, a proper task analysis and cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken prior to radical reductions. In other words, it is again pointless to take 10 crewmen off a ship if the shore repair and shipyard lost-time costs will exceed the cost of the eliminated crew.
As one who makes his living at sea, I do not advocate manning reduction as the best avenue for increasing ship operational efficiency, much preferring an increase in crew productivity as a more profitable alternative. This, unfortunately, may be an unattainable goal within our present structure. In the meantime, manning reduction is a recognized worldwide trend which must be addressed if one is to compete. So, if we must do it, let’s do it right.
Captain Seitz was graduated from the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York, in 1956 and has had an extensive seafaring background in all licensed deck capacities. He was navigation officer of the passenger ship America and has more than ten years' experience as master of vessels which include the following types: dry cargo, tanker, containership. chemical carrier, and special purpose ships. During leave periods, he has worked as special assistant to the president of the International Organization of Masters. Mates and Pilots and has been involve1! in collision-avoidance studies in the Computer Assisted Operations Research Facility at Kings Point. His article "Vessel Traffic' Systems: A View from the Bridge" was published in the April 1975 Proceedings. He is now permanent master of the VLCf tanker B. T. San Diego, operated by Marine Transport Lines.
Proceedings / October 1^*'