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By Captain John J. Kieley III, U.S. Navy (Retired)
For the many difficult tactical situations that may present themselves in the low-intensity conflicts that are envisaged for the future, the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates are much better suited than the Ticon- deroga (CG-47)-class guided missile cruisers.
The Ticonderoga-class and its Aegis system were designed primarily for one job—protecting aircraft carrier battle groups against high-density raids from a sophisticated threat. In performing this task, the Ticonderoga- class is second to none, but, in many others, they are just too much warship for the job.
First, there is cost. The Navy must be smart about the budget dollar if it is to maintain a capable fleet. In 1986 dollars, a Perry- class frigate cost approximately $400 million to build and fit out; a Ticonderoga-class cruiser cost over $1 billion. A Perry-class
frigate has a total complement of 206 to a Ticonderoga-class cruiser's 364 officers and crew.
The capabilities of a Perry- class frigate, especially the later versions, for working in low-intensity conflicts are impressive.
Its two embarked helicopters— SH-60 LAMPS III—have longer range than their predecessors, longer on-station time (four hours), and sensor and weapon systems that are extremely effective in antisurface warfare as well as ASW. The Perry-class frigates' high speed and exceptional maneuverability—because of their bow thrusters and gas turbine propulsion—make them invaluable for operations in shallow and confined waters, where brush-fire wars will be fought.
There are other advantages to the Perry-class besides reduced manpower costs and excellent capabilities. In any crisis situation, restraint can prevent an accident
or some trivial incident from leading to a full-blown shooting match. The large number of people in the command-and-control loop coupled with the automatic nature of the Aegis system could easily lead to another tragedy like the 1988 destruction of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes (CG-49), or worse. The captain of a Perry-class frigate standing behind an operations specialist in the ship's combat information center can see the raw video display and, so, has a more immediate grasp of the total situation.
The captain of a Ticonderoga- class cruiser may receive too much information and must take the word of the people who are giving him that information and, therefore, may feel compelled to “shoot first and ask questions later.”
Captain Kieley was the commissioning captain of the USS Reuben James (FFG-57).
matured into a valid, broadly based portion of the U.S. fleet. Words such as “mainstay” and “indispensable” may apply, as well.
FFGs have earned their status. They are rugged (with such vivid survivability examples as the Stark [FFG-31] and Samuel B. Roberts [FFG-58] fresh in our minds), wide ranging (proved in operations from the Arctic Circle to the Gulf War) and versatile (from independent patrols to battle group support). They employ state-of-the-art technology in many mission areas and are the fleet commander’s choice to carry out many current day-to-day assignments.
The FFG cannot substitute for a battle force combatant as represented by Ticonderoga cruisers or Arleigh Burke destroyers. The FFG’s design requirements and inherent size limitations restrict sustainability, equipment redundancy, and the ability to control the tactical situation in an advanced multithreat environment. What the class can do, though, is to augment existing battle groups in this era of reduced fleet size. Fleet requirement will undoubtedly not decrease as rapidly as fleet size over the next decade, and FFGs are more operationally affordable than the larger combatants.
Properly modernized today, the FFG also will serve as a necessary and capable bridge to the future. The FFG is a class already bought and paid for. We must not underemphasize this class’s contributions or forget where it fits into the master picture, in spite of all the hoopla associated with the latest Aegis building program.
In the foreseeable future, the FFG will carry the flame and will be the ship that fleet commanders worldwide can depend on. The challenge for this decade has changed from one of simply finding a niche for this stalwart ship to one of actively keeping the class employed and modernized, now that it has found that niche.
Commander Linder currently is attached to the staff of Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. He commanded the USS Elrod (FFG- 55) from 1989 to 1991.
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Proceedings / January 1992