3 FEBRUARY to 3 MARCH
NEW NAVAL LIMITATION PROPOSAL
President Coolidge's Message.—On February 10, without the usual preliminary diplomatic inquiries, President Coolidge sent to Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy identic memoranda proposing that these powers, with the United States, take up reduction of naval armament separately from land and air armaments, and empower their delegations which assemble for the Geneva conference in March to negotiate an agreement applying the 5-5-3 ratio to auxiliary vessels, except that the ratio for France and Italy might be left open for discussion in the conference. The note, with an accompanying explanatory message, was at the same time submitted to Congress.
In his note President Coolidge called attention to the well recognized difficulty of securing agreement for simultaneous reduction of land, sea, and air armaments among all nations, and expressed his belief that it was the duty of groups of nations to proceed to the solution of separate problems which might help toward the solution of the larger one. The method of “regional agreements,” he pointed out, was not applicable to naval limitation, but it did appear open to solution by a group of the major naval powers, and he felt that it might be taken up by the Geneva delegates without interference with their work of preparation for a general conference. The concrete proposals were contained in the following paragraph:
The American Government feels that the general principles of the Washington Treaty offer a suitable basis for further discussions among its signatories.
Although hesitating at this time to put forward rigid proposals as regards the ratios of naval strength to be maintained by the different powers, the American Government, for its part, is disposed to accept, in regard to those classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty, an extension of the 5-5-3 ratio as regards the United States, Great Britain and Japan, and to leave to discussion at Geneva the ratios of France and Italy, taking into full account their special conditions and requirements in regard to the types of vessels in question. Ratios for capital ships and aircraft carriers were established by that treaty which would not be affected in any way by an agreement covering other classes of ships.
France and Italy Decline.—France, the first nation to reply to the President’s proposal, sent on February 15 a very courteous note refusing to take part in a separate naval conference. The reasons given were : (1) that it would "risk compromising the success of the work already begun at Geneva”; (2) that it would “enfeeble the authority of the League of Nations” by transferring from the League Disarmament Commission to a small group of states a great problem upon which the Commission had been actively engaged; (3) that limitation of auxiliary vessels differs from capital ship limitation in that it is of the greatest importance to many nations; and hence consideration of it by five powers only would violate the principle of equality of states and give results probably unacceptable and unwelcome to nations not represented; (4) that France, believing in and standing committed to the principles of considering land, sea, and air forces together, and limiting naval armaments only by total tonnage, could not consistently enter the conference proposed. In conclusion the French Government indicated clearly its preference for continued effort toward disarmament under the League of Nations, as more likely to secure permanent and generally acceptable results.
The Italian reply, received February 21, was brief and firm, taking the ground that Italy could not accept limitations not imposed on all nations and not applying to all instruments of warfare. The note pointed out that Italy’s average new construction for the last five years, amounting to only $13,000,000 yearly, could hardly class her as a nation with “a far-reaching naval program.” The note also emphasized the naval needs of Italy based on her long coast line, islands, over-seas colonial possessions, and absolute dependence on sea communications.
Japanese Reply Favorable.—The Japanese reply, received February 19, was entirely affirmative. It “shared the views expressed by the American Government regarding the desirability of an agreement calculated to complete the work of the Washington Conference,” and “cordially welcomed the initiative taken by the American Government.” The note suggested that the date should not be earlier than June 1, to permit the attendance of delegates specially sent from Tokio, and it expressed especial approval of the idea of “not putting forward rigid proposals” as to ratios. These, it said, could better be decided by mutual accommodation in the conference.
British Acceptance.—The British reply, received February 28, was a qualified acceptance. The note, less than 200 words long, follows:
His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain received with cordial sympathy the invitation of the Government of the United States of America to take part in a conversation at Geneva on the further limitation of naval armament.
The views of His Majesty’s Government upon the special geographical position of the British Empire, the length of interimperial communications and the necessity for the protection of its food supplies are well known, and together with the special conditions and requirements of the other countries invited to participate in the conversation must be taken into account.
His Majesty’s Government is nevertheless prepared to consider to what extent the principles adopted at Washington can be carried further either as regards the ratio in different classes of ships between the various powers or in other important ways. They therefore accept the invitation of the Government of the United States of America and will do their best to further the success of the proposed conversation.
They would, however, observe that the relationship of such a conversation to the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva would require careful adjustment.
Possibility of Three Power Conference.—The refusal of France and Italy to accept President Coolidge’s offer raised the possibility of a conference of the three major naval powers, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Pending the receipt of the British reply, there was no definite indication of the attitude of the American Government toward such a conference. Sentiment in the British press appeared to indicate that, under such circumstances, Great Britain could not consent to a reduction of her present cruiser strength. A hint of the British attitude appeared in an extract from the London Morning Post, quoted in the New York Times of February 14:
“The proposals of the President of the United States for a further agreement to reduce the naval forces of the maritime powers would seem to be inspired rather by altruism habitually associated with America than by an appreciation of the principles of naval power, at least as understood in this country,” says the Morning Post.
“It appears that President Coolidge shares, at least in part, the views of those who regard the existence of armed forces as in itself a provocation to war,” the Post continues. “England, on the other hand, has always considered her possession of a powerful fleet as the best, if not the only, guarantee for the maintenance of peace.
“In the past the Continental Powers have done homage to that axiom, inasmuch as they have invariably taken account of the use which the greatest maritime power might make of the British Navy in the event of a declaration of war on the part of a power or powers of the Continent. Time and again war has been prevented by the announcement of the intentions of the British Government in this respect. Moreover, it is common knowledge that the frontiers of the British Empire are sea frontiers and that they can be protected in an emergency only by the control exercised by the Royal Navy over the trade routes of the sea.
“It is a singular circumstance that there has never yet appeared an advocate for general disarmament who did not overlook the realities and confuse the weapons of war with the causes of war.”
Scrapping of Capital Ships Proposed. —One of the suggestions arising from the naval limitations discussion was that of Rear Admiral Murray F. Seuter of the British Navy, to the effect that the powers agree to abolish capital ships altogether, retaining only cruisers and other auxiliaries. In American circles this suggestion was pronounced irrelevant, and moreover, unacceptable, since, in the absence of capital ships, Great Britain would have a greatly increased relative naval strength by virtue of her larger merchant marine.
Advance of Cantonese Forces.—Although at the beginning of February the northern armies in China under the general control of Chang-Tso-lin began the execution of plans for concentration against the Cantonese forces, the advance of the latter toward Shanghai was at first met only by the army of Sun Chuan-fang, military ruler of the province in which Shanghai is situated. Early in the month the Cantonese suffered some reverses, but on February 18, they gained a victory which enabled them to occupy the great city of Hangchow, only 113 miles from Shanghai. Sun’s army was completely disorganized, and the defense of the Shanghai area was taken over by Chang Tsung-chang, Shantung war lord and experienced subordinate of Chang Tso-lin. Sentiment among the civilian population swung strongly in favor of the Cantonese.
Meanwhile, further to the westward, the Cantonese were threatened by advance of the northern forces against the Cantonese capital, Hankow. It was expected that the Cantonese progress toward Shanghai would be held up pending a decisive conflict in this inner theater, the results of which would be in turn largely dependent upon the attitude taken by the independent military leaders Feng (the Christian General) and Wu Pei-fu, both of whose armies were not far distant and were waiting to enter the conflict on the most promising side.
Hankow Agreement Signed.—During February, negotiations continued at Hankow between British Charge O’Malley and Foreign Minister Eugene Chen (Chen Yu-jen). On February 19, an agreement was signed relating to the administration of the British concession at Hankow, and providing for its transfer to a mixed Sino-British council in which the Chinese would have the casting vote. The British concession at Kiukiang was to be covered by a similar agreement. It was stated that negotiations along the same lines would be undertaken by British Minister Miles Lampson at Peking.
The Hankow discussions were at various times interrupted by Minister Chen’s vigorous protests against the concentration of British forces at Shanghai, and by his threats to break off negotiations unless it were stopped. These protests the British disregarded, but according to Chen there was a “modification of the original plan of concentration” which permitted him to continue the discussion.
The Situation at Shanghai.—With 1100 or more marines on the U.S. vessels at Shanghai, and with the sailing of the Chaumont from San Diego on February 3 with about 1300 marines and officers, it was estimated that the American forces available for landing at Shanghai if necessary would be over 2,500. The British had about 4,000 troops in the city and 2,500 more on ships in the harbor, and some 12,000 reinforcements were expected to reach Shanghai before the end of the month.
Chinese civilian sentiment in Shanghai, though not obviously antiforeign, became increasingly pro-Cantonese and hostile toward the local Chinese authorities. On February 19 from 80,000 to 100,000 Chinese workers went on strike in celebration of the Cantonese victory at Hangchow. Isolated attacks on foreigners occurred, and a force of 1,600 special police was mobilized to patrol the foreign concessions and prevent riots. Twenty agitators were beheaded by the Chinese authorities in the native city.
Early in February, Secretary Kellogg sent messages to both the Peking and Hankow governments proposing the exclusion of Shanghai from the theater of military operations. This apparently was not seriously considered by either of the warring factions, probably because control of the revenues of the port of Shanghai with its immense foreign trade (40 per cent of the total foreign commerce of China) is one of the chief objectives of the present campaign. Later, on February 25, the diplomatic corps at Peking notified the Northern leaders that unless the safety of the foreign concessions were assured, the foreign authorities would be forced to take necessary measures for their protection.
On February 22, a Chinese gunboat, one of three whose crews went over to the southern faction, deliberately threw shells into the French concession at Shanghai and into the native city. It was claimed that the shells were aimed at the Woosung Arsenal. On February 27, the Chinese Defense Commissioner ordered the Woosung approach to the Whangpoo river closed at night to prevent a surprise naval attack.
British Cruiser Sent to Nicaragua.— A new element entered into the Nicaragua situation with the despatch of the British cruiser Colombo from Bermuda to Corinto, Nicaragua, where she arrived on February 26. The British Government at once notified the United States of the decision to send this vessel for the protection of British interests, gave assurance that no forces would be landed, and added that the British Government looked to the United States to extend the same measure of protection to British subjects as was afforded to those of the United States. Representatives of Italy and other powers also made requests to the United States for protection of their interests.
The American State department made no objection to the despatch of the British cruiser, and gave assurances that British interests would be protected so far as possible. The action of the British and other governments was evidently welcomed as providing strong support for the present American policy.
United States Forces Increased.—On February 20, about 600 sailors from the U.S.S. Galveston, Milwaukee, and Raleigh were landed at Corinto and stationed to guard the rail communications between Corinto and the Nicaraguan capital, Mam agua, which were seriously threatened by the Liberals. These forces were to remain ashore until the arrival of about 1,400 marines and six airplanes on the transport Henderson, which left Norfolk on February 23. Brigadier General Logan Feland, commander of the marine base at Quantico, was appointed to command the U.S. forces in Nicaragua.
The decision to land additional forces was the outcome of a conference between U. S. Minister Eberhardt, Colonel Mead of the marines, and Rear Admiral Latimer, who returned to Corinto on February 19 after a series of conferences with the Liberal leader, Sacasa, at Puerta Cabezas. At the time of the additional landings, the Liberal forces had made considerable progress in northwestern Nicaragua, at one time capturing Chinandega and cutting rail communication between Managua and the coast, although this city was later retaken by the Conservatives. Altogether, the United States forces have established eight neutral zones, at Puerta Cabezas, Prinzapulka, Pearl Lagoon, and Bluefields on the east coast, and in western Nicaragua at Corinto, Managua, and Leon, leaving only Mata- galpa and Granada unprotected.
Proposed Nicaraguan Protectorate.— In the latter part of February President Diaz made definite proposals for an alliance with the United States amounting to a protectorate, including financial supervision, a military mission, and a loan of $20,000,000 for railroad construction. The attitude of the American State Department toward this proposal was not favorable.
In the United States Senate, Senator Borah introduced a resolution proposing that a Senate committee should visit Central America during the coming summer. This resolution, which apparently involved a definite assumption of the conduct of foreign affairs by the Senate, was modified in the Foreign Affairs Committee so as to limit the activities of the proposed committee to American soil, and was then favorably reported, but its approval by the Senate appeared doubtful.
Data on Oil Companies in Mexico.— According to information given to the Senate by Secretary Kellogg on February 16, only four of the fifty American oil companies in Mexico have applied for confirmatory concessions as required by the new Mexican oil law. Of these, two are not actively producing oil, and the other two do not hold fee simple titles. The fifty companies, according to Secretary Kellogg, control 90 per cent of the actively producing oil lands acquired before the Mexican Constitution of 1917, and produce 70 per cent of the Mexican oil. The secretary in his statement quoted Mexican law at length to show that the right to exploit oil resources was fully guaranteed to companies under Mexican laws prior to 1917.
These figures were apparently at striking variance with data given out by the Mexican Department of Industry, Commerce, and Labor on February 21, according to which 125 companies have applied for confirmatory concessions during the past year, including Standard Oil and other important American concerns.
Several American companies made application to the Mexican Supreme Court for injunctions restraining action under the new law, and the Mexican government gave assurance that there would be no confiscation until after a court decision.
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
Participation in Economic Conference.—Prior to the appointment of delegates to the Geneva Economic Conference, to open May 4, President Coolidge sought the sanction of Congress by a message, on February 5, requesting an appropriation of $15,000 for the expenses of the American representatives. In his message the President pointed out that the powers of the Conference were limited to advice and recommendations, that American interests were deeply involved, and it would be well for this country to share in the important work of economic reconstruction to be undertaken.
European opinion, as expressed by Mr. Hugh Spender in an article in the February Fortnightly Review, considered it fortunate that the delegates were to be chosen for their personal qualifications rather than as “spokesmen of official policy.” “Freedom of Commerce” and “Customs, Tariffs, and Commercial Treaties” are the first two headings in the second and main part of the agenda of the Conference, from which it is evident that modification or removal of European trade barriers is one of the chief problems with which the conference must deal. In the words of Sir Arthur Salter, head of the Economic Commission of the League, “the results of the conference will not be immediate; it will educate public opinion, it will supply the motive forces for more specialized practical work to follow; and, as with the Brussels Conference, its main results will only be attained and can only be measured gradually in the years to come.”
World Court Entry Dropped.—The British reply to the United States regarding its World Court reservations was received early in February. As was expected, this note conformed in content to the draft reply agreed upon by the nations adherent to the court in their conference on the subject last September. Following news of the British note, a resolution was presented in the U. S. Senate by Senator Trammel, designed to rescind the action by which the Senate consented to application for membership. The resolution was defeated, 59 to 30, but it was generally recognized that there was no longer a possibility of American participation. President Coolidge in his Kansas City speech last November stated clearly his belief that the reply agreed upon by the member powers was not acceptable, and his decision not to present the question again to the Senate.
United States in Private Arms Manufacture Parley.—The United States Government on February 25 indicated to the League Secretariat its intention to take part in the preliminary conference set for March 14 to consider a draft convention on private manufacture of arms and munitions. The note expressed willingness to enter into an agreement providing for publication of statistics regarding arms manufacture, if these statistics should cover both private and government production.
France Offers Debt Payments.—After agreement to pay Great Britain £6,000,000 during the coming fiscal year, Premier Poincare on February 19, through the French financial attache in Washington, made proposals for a similar payment of $30,000,000 to the United States. This would be $10,000,000 in excess of the interest due this year on the French debt for purchase of surplus United States war materials.
In answer to objections offered in the French chamber, Premier Poincare made it clear that these payments would in no way commit the French Government to acceptance of the British or United States debt funding agreements. Both these agreements have been signed, but neither has been ratified by the French parliament, and action on the American agreement has been postponed at least until next autumn. With accumulated gold assets of upwards of $500,000,000, it is evident that the proposed payments will not seriously embarrass French finances.
Turkish Treaty Extended.—According to Associated Press despatches of February 17, Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, United States High Commissioner at Angora, on that date completed negotiations for an extension of the existing temporary trade agreement between the United States and Turkey.
Italo-Albanian Treaty Registered.— The treaty of “friendship and security” between Italy and Albania was registered with the League of Nations Secretariat on February 8, together with an accompanying explanatory letter from the Italian Minister in Albania to the Albanian Foreign Office. This letter was intended to make clear that there are no secret clauses connected with the treaty, and the mutual support pledged can “only come into operation if one of the two parties so requests.” Since, obviously, Italy might be the first to propose aid under this arrangement, the assurances in the letter did not serve wholly to allay Jugoslav suspicions of Italy; but reports from other sources indicated that relations between the two chief Adriatic states were more friendly than a month before.
German Nationalist Policy.—In his address to the Reichtag on February 3, setting forth the policies of the new Center- Nationalist coalition government, Chancellor Marx characterized the security treaties and Germany’s entrance into the League as “a renunciation of revenge,” and he emphasized the complete acceptance of this policy by his Nationalist confreres. Speaking for the Nationalists, however, their leader, Count Westarp, made it clear that, while his party accepted the Marx-Stresemann foreign policy and acknowledged present loyalty to the republic, they had not surrendered the ultimate aim of restoring the monarchy by legal means. Referring to relations with Poland, he declared subsequently (February 14) that the German policy must be to “isolate that country,” and reject all overtures tending toward guaranteeing the eastern frontiers of Germany in the same fashion that the western borders are secured by the Locarno compacts.
Following the advent of the Nationalists in the German government, there was a noticeable stiffening of policy toward Poland, marked especially in difficulties over the present trade negotiations, and protests regarding the treatment of Germans employed in Poland.
Pilsudski Forces Budget Acceptance. —Opposition to Pilsudski which had been manifested in the Polish Sejm (Assembly) was suddenly put down by the dramatic appearance of the Marshal himself on February 14. Under his personal supervision, the government budget was voted without material alteration.
Failure of Portugese Revolt.—A military uprising in Portugal, led by General Sousa Diaz and other soldier-politicians, broke out in Oporto on February 3 and was later taken up by some of the military and naval units in Lisbon. The revolt, latest of twenty or more since Portgual became a republic in 1910, was directed against the dictator-president, General Carmona, who has been in power since his overthrow of da Costa last July. On February 10, after bombardment of rebel strongholds in Oporto and Lisbon, and 1,000 estimated casualties, the revolt was reported to be put down.
Sharp British Protest to Russia.—A British, protest against Soviet propaganda was sent to Moscow on February 23. Expressed in blunt language, it ended with the statement that continuance of the acts cited would "render inevitable the abrogation of the trade agreement, the stipulations of which have been so flagrantly violated, and even the severance of ordinary diplomatic relations.” The note referred especially to the anti-British campaign of the Soviets in China, their open support of the coal strikers, and their false allegations as to British schemes in Poland, Persia and elsewhere. In England, the protest marked a victory for the “Die hard” wing of the cabinet led by Lord Birkenhead and Winston Churchill over the moderate element, who felt it would do no good and might hurt British trade.
The Russian reply was conciliatory in tone, but cited similar unfavorable criticism of the Soviet Union by British officials, such as Winston Churchill and others, and declared that if trade relations were abrogated the responsibility must lie with the British government.