“Against All Enemies”
(See R. J. Hanks, pp. 22-29, March; pp. 97-101, June; pp. 89-96, July; pp. 95-96, August; and p. 85, October 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
John M. Gore—It is strange how things work out. I do not think, for example, that the selection of the prize essay was, in itself, a good thing. While emotionally gratifying, “Against All Enemies” does not have the intellectual characteristics I should have thought necessary to win. But, its selection and publication did result in a flood of letters in the Comment and Discussion section of the PROCEEDINGS.
Taken as a whole, the essay and these letters turn out to be a very good thing, indeed. They reveal so clearly a variety of ways of thinking—or feeling—among people generally dedicated to the same ultimate goals. Each way doubtless has numerous adherents among the readers who did not write. Each must be taken into account in the resolution of the troubles that beset us. Each must be listened to with some measure of charity. Each can learn something from the other. So, in the long run, I think the selection of the essay served us well.
Commander W. J. Holland, Jr., U. S. Navy—The prize essay is unjust in its basis that: General Shoup and Colonel Donovan’s article is pacifistic, based on the General’s disillusionment and without previous historical precedent; Professor Galbraith represents academicia [sic]; and Congressmen equal Congress. Most officers have not read either of the two references, and, on extended tours of sea duty rarely are able to maintain viable contact with the political reality of congressional action as distinguished from the sensational reporting of the news media.
Secondly, Captain Hanks indicates that the present questioning of the worth or need for military expenditures is new or scandalous. Yet, his quotation from Kipling’s “Tommy Atkins” indicates the long-standing suspicion with which the military has been viewed in Western societies. The concern of the founders of the Republic regarding a standing army is well known. Twenty-three years after the flush of the Civil War when the Grand Army of the Republic was hailed as the nation’s savior, no money was appropriated for support of the Army, then fighting two active campaigns against the Indians in the Southwest, for an entire year. Woodrow Wilson summarized the attitude which has prevailed through most of America’s history when he said, “The military should speak only when spoken to.”
Captain Hanks’s statement, “Even General Shoup admits that the American Armed Forces include large numbers of intelligent and articulate individuals” demonstrates his mistaken interpretation of the aim of the article. The General repeatedly points out that it is the great preponderance of intelligence, ability, and drive in military circles which gives those Services such a strong voice. His argument is not to dilute this voice by weakening it, but to balance it by strengthening the ability, intelligence, and drive of the civilian agencies operating in the field of foreign affairs. The General argues that the military invariably offers concrete, rapid, and relatively simple solutions through the use or threat of force. That such solutions are not always militarily or politically correct is historically factual, but the successes of U. S. military efforts in the lifetimes of present decision makers, plus the concreteness of the proposed solutions, make the military proposals exceedingly attractive in the competition of ideas presented to the decision maker—particularly in times of crises. Any reading about the interventions in the Dominican Republic or Lebanon uncovers the paucity of non-military solutions offered at the time. In these events, as in many others, the civilian arms demanded the military solution because a non-military solution was either not available, too slow, or undeveloped. General Shoup would lessen the need for force by improving the quality and availability of non-violent or political solutions, and by providing a strong countervoice to delineate the political limitations of the military proposals.
Not all situations can be resolved by use or threat of force. A key judgment is to determine those that can from those that cannot. In this judgment, the “can do” attitude engendered in the Service must be balanced by a knowledge of the military and political limitations inherent in that particular situation. General Shoup points out how the “can do” attitude can become so overwhelming that the military tries to have a solution to every problem. In addition to the action which Captain Hanks outlines to police ourselves, we need also to guard against a belief in the infallibility of our proposals and missions.
The second basis of the essay—that Professor Galbraith speaks for the educational community is just not valid. Though he writes extremely well, his arguments are popular and are not designed to withstand intellectual questioning. In his latest article in Harper’s, he describes himself as a “gadfly”—hardly a statement describing academic prowess or political leverage. No public servant of any nature can expect to escape the criticism of such seekers of popular acclaim and royalties. It is a mistake to impute to such more influence than due, or to waste effort countering every allegation or insinuation. In this regard, Professor Galbraith belongs to the family of popular journalists like Drew Pearson rather than scholarly critical comment of Kissinger or Schelling.
Finally, Captain Hanks uses several examples of Congressional pressures to reduce force levels, “. . . regardless of consequences.” Certainly such instances are on the rise, but it is wise to recall that the Congress forced construction of major surface warships in 1968 after the Executive branch spent five years without laying a single major ship keel. The actions of individual Congressmen arise from many motives too complex to judge except when the total of these motives is represented by concrete action in the form of law. Congress is, after all, empowered to raise armies and support and maintain the Navy. Congressional support and confidence has been amply demonstrated since 1940, and, in balance, has generally been more favorable to maintenance of a strong military establishment than the Executive.
Wars are rarely popular—World War II was an extraordinary exception in our history, primarily because of the nature of entrance and character of the enemy. Tories in the Revolution, New England Federalists in 1812, Whigs—including Lincoln—during the Mexican War, Copperheads in the Civil War, anti-expansionists during the Spanish American War, and pacificists in World War I were all large and vocal opponents of the war in their time. Though Korea began with some of the flavor and fervor of the commitment of World War II, that attitude faded rapidly. Vietnam is not the exception, and to expect the vigorous and whole-hearted support of the population is self-deluding. By this call to action based on our oath to defend the Constitution “. . . against all enemies . . . ,” Captain Hanks impugns the motives of the opponents of the present war and of those who would redistribute national resources out of the military sphere. Such an allegation only incites without convincing. We can better serve by attempting to understand our own capabilities and limitations, by respecting the motives if not the judgment of those who are critical, and then by executing the program Captain Hanks has outlined of speaking forthrightly and professionally on the subject.
“The Minesweeping/Fishing Vessel”
(See H. A. Chatterton, pp. 121-125, June 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Michael Miller, U. S. Navy, Integrated Sealift Study Group—The trend toward larger minesweepers has been viewed with alarm by many of us who have had to participate in in-shore minesweeping operations. There are, however, some severe, and perhaps insurmountable problems associated with Mr. Chatterton’s proposal.
The advent of the influence mine radically changed the techniques and increased the difficulty of minesweeping. The influence mine forced the development of the non-magnetic, quiet minesweepers seen in the present day minesweeper, coastal (non-magnetic) (MSC), and minesweeper, ocean (non-magnetic) (MSO), of the U. S. fleet. Mr. Chatterton has proposed a non-magnetic, fiber glass hull with single, presumable magnetic, Caterpillar D-398 engine. In the development of the MSC and MSO, it was demonstrated that, even with the most sophisticated degaussing system, a non-magnetic hull alone was not sufficient to safeguard a ship from magnetically actuated mines. It is necessary to have, as far as possible, non-magnetic fittings, non-magnetic equipment, and nonmagnetic engines. Experience with the Packard and General Motors non-magnetic engines have shown them to be technically demanding of a high degree of maintenance and also very expensive. A non-magnetic engine, requiring a high degree of maintenance, probably would not be viable either economically or technically in a fishing vessel.
In the same way, Navy minesweepers in existence today have had to institute stringent magnetic equipment control procedures in order to maintain acceptable levels of magnetic signature. Special non-magnetic tools, screws, bolts, and even degaussed food lockers are required. It would be difficult for a vessel involved in day-to-day fishing operations to maintain her minimum acceptable level of magnetic signature.
The next problem is one of personnel. Minesweeping is a technically demanding area of naval warfare. It requires a relatively large, well-trained crew and excellent co-ordination between ships in minesweeping formations. The degree of training necessary to maintain a qualified crew is difficult, even with an active minesweeper operating with the Fleet. The U. S. Navy has had a singular lack of success in maintaining a reliable reserve minesweeping capability, even when a nucleus crew of personnel on active duty is maintained on board a reserve minesweeper. In addition, in order to ensure a reasonable amount of endurance, a minesweeper must have a relatively large crew to provide personnel for handling of minesweeping gear, watch standing, and navigational duties. There does not appear to be enough room on board Mr. Chatterton’s fishing vessel to provide the crew required for endurance minesweeping.
While at first look, the minesweeping/fishing craft would appear to have merit, the peculiar characteristics required in modern minesweeping ships precludes easy and inexpensive solutions. Nonmagnetic ships and engineering plants are, and probably always will be, extremely expensive and will demand rigorous maintenance. The Navy should finally realize that there are no cheap, easy ways of sweeping sophisticated mines. Concepts such as minesweeping helicopters and minesweeping launches should assist in solving the problem with in-shore support, but again this is costly sophistication, and, there always will be a need for minesweeping ships that have an all-weather capability.
Today, it is questionable whether the Navy, with its limited number of aging minesweepers, can fulfill its missions in this vital area. As Mr. Chatterton pointed out, an enemy with a relatively small degree of effort could tie up U. S. shipping by mining major ports. With the minesweeping resources in existence, it would take months before these ports could be cleared. Traditionally, our Navy has been shortsighted in mine warfare, and the mine forces have been relegated to lower priority in terms of ships, funds, and personnel. It is perhaps, too much to hope that the next time minesweepers are required, there will be enough of them to do the job. The men who will be forced to go to sea in improvised minesweepers will suffer the consequences of our shortsighted planning.
“Combat Readiness Training”
(See J. B. Kusewitt and W. A. Speer, pp. 45-49, March; and pp. 96-97 July 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander Lawrence S. Scott, U. S. Navy—The article, as presented in the PROCEEDINGS, which is only extracted from a larger study, gives only enough information to make the entire study suspect, if not unbelievable.
First, when one number so completely dominates the cost and value analysis as does the value of combat readiness training (CRT) to aviation officer retention ($244 million is greater than all other costs or benefit values used) it must be thoroughly substantiated, but it certainly was not in the article.
Apparently, the 1968 CRT survey investigated officers of the grades of ensign through lieutenant commander to establish this value. Virtually no ensigns or lieutenants (j.g.) are in the CRT program. Relatively few lieutenants are in the program, and all have completed their first squadron tour. Many, if not most, lieutenant commanders in the CRT program have completed their second squadron tour, and are unlikely to return to operational flying. Thus, it is quite possible that the survey was biased by sampling from a population larger than the directly affected one. Asking a very junior officer what he would do four years in the future, or a relatively senior officer what he might have done four years ago under a given set of assumptions, will produce some subjective responses.
Let us assume that 1,100 additional aviators per year would be attrited if there were no CRT program. Using other figures from the text, and assuming that all of these 1,100 had completed an operational tour (roughly 50% of their total operational time), it appears that $244 million is a good approximation of the cost of training replacements. It does not mean that the CRT program is that valuable. Is there an alternative to the spending of $244 million per year or having a CRT program? I say yes.
Suppose aviators were offered a bonus to remain on active duty for five years, as are nuclear submariners. At the end of that period, 90% of their operational flying would be completed. Even if the bonus were two or three times that paid to nuclear submariners, say $20,000 or $30,000, the cost would be only $30 to $50 million per year. This is much less than $244 million and makes the value to cost ratio of the CRT program less than 1:1. This could be done in such a manner as to make it hard to resist. Pay the bonus in such a way as to minimize the tax impact. Change the rotation pattern to become squadron-to-ship (the bonus decision point) or staff-to-squadron. In this way, the individual would know he was getting the bonus for additional sea duty. But, at the end of his five-year additional obligation, he could look down the pike and see shore duty, postgraduate school, and an opportunity to specialize in a particular warfare area. He would know that unless his performance had been superior enough to screen him for command and ensure he was “still in the running,” he could look forward to a relatively uninterrupted stint in his specialty.
There is a second alternative, somewhat similar to the first, which entails a longer “first tour.” Increase the initial period of obligated service to six or seven years with some appropriate compensation. Have three-year tours of operational flying broken only by a one- or two-year period of shore duty, during which the pilot could remain current in type such as at a replacement or staff.
There is an even more attractive alternative, hinted at in the article but dismissed by the authors. That alternative is the joint use of aircraft. By this I mean not only joint CRT, Naval Air Reserve, (NAR) usage, but also joint CRT-operational usage. Provisions could be made to permit virtually all pilots in CRT billets to fly the same type aircraft that they flew operationally. It is not at all clear that the necessary ground time to take A-4 or A-7 pilots from Monterey (where there is a large concentration of CRT pilots) to Lemoore, or P-3 pilots to Moffett, or F-4 or P-3 pilots from Washington to Norfolk, is excessively inefficient. In addition to the retention value, which would probably be great, there would be significant cost reductions in refresher training, force reaction time, voluntary groundings and, probably, accidents. This alternative is probably the most attractive, and apparently was not treated in the study.
There is another “suspect” statistic included in the article. That is the aircraft cost in an improved CRT program. It is difficult to envision that investment cost of adequate numbers and types of new “off the shelf” aircraft (even amortized over 15 years), plus annual operating costs would come to less than half the current annual operating costs ($40 versus $87 million).
To an aviator who has had over three years of CRT flying, as well as systems analysis experience in OpNav, the tone of the article is that the typical approach to the problem was taken. The desired answer was known, the problem was formulated, and a study was done to proceed “logically,” from problem to the desired solution. This type of effect has not been successful in the past and is unlikely to be successful in the future.
“Naval Air Training: A Change Is Needed”
(See D. R. Wright, pp. 115-117, February 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander R. K. Culbertson, U. S. Naval Reserve, Staff, Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training—Lieutenant Wright makes a good case for updating the Training Command pipelines. In view of the reduction in ASW carrier resources, the procurement of the F-14 and S-3, and the efforts being made to retain a minimum of 15 CVAs, his suggested revision should go one step further. This step would logically be to have a single, all-jet training pipeline right through to designation as a naval aviator.
In conjunction with a single training pipeline, there would have to be several “advanced” pipelines available for newly-designated pilots before final assignment to a specific fleet unit. These would primarily be RAGs for attack/fighter squadrons (VA/VF)[,] helicopter antisubmarine/helicopter combat support squadrons (HS/HC), air antisubmarine squadrons (VS, VP), carrier airborne early warning squadrons (VAW), and heavy attack squadrons (VAH). With the fleet tactical support squadron (VR) Navy gasping its final breath, the VS S-2 community in a rather precarious position, and special mission units such as air development squadrons (VX), airborne early warning squadrons (VW), fleet composite squadrons (VC), and fleet air reconnaissance squadrons (VQ) using a particular RAG or qualifying in-squadron, there is no longer a valid reason for the Navy to continue recip-prop training or multi-pipelines. It is also doubtful whether the Navy will ever again procure a non-jet powered aircraft.
If we are, in fact, going to a “compact Navy” in this decade, we must certainly make up in quality what we will lose in quantity. During the last several years, the increased input requirements for Pensacola caused some loss in quality of candidates selected for flight training. Unfortunately, a larger portion of these students than we care to admit were draft motivated. This can be evidenced by the high percentage of voluntary dropouts from flight training in the last two years—running somewhere between 40 and 50%.
Due to operational cutbacks, the input requirements for Pensacola have also dropped. Yearly inputs have been reduced from a recent high of 2,400 to 2,500, to a suggested input in fiscal year 71 of 1,600 to 1,700. It would appear that we stand a better chance of attracting the well-motivated, high-quality students we want to fill these 1,600 to 1,700 openings if we can, in fact, fulfill our recruiting pitch to a young man to sign up and “fly your own jet.” This pipeline change, if incorporated, should also reflect in a reduced dropout rate among students and an increased retention rate among second tour pilots (now running a poor 26 to 30%).
In the event we are unable to fill even these reduced requirements, perhaps we should open up a program similar to the NavCad or Aviation Midshipman program of a few years ago. The dropout rate among these groups was relatively low, and the retention rate was relatively high. Students entering these programs had no wife or children to worry about during training, as many do now, they cost the Navy less to train, and the majority took a positive approach and were seldom exceeded when it came to motivation and “tiger blood.” Our “compact Navy” of the 1970s can certainly do with a “passel” of these.
The United States Accepts A 12-Mile Limit
Commander William E. Night, U. S. Naval Reserve—The vexatious and persistent problem of the breadth of the territorial sea may finally be resolved, since the United States has at last agreed to accept 12 miles as the territorial limits of the marginal sea. With this concession by the strongest adherent to the traditional 3-mile limit, the United Nations will, convene another conference to consider extending the territorial sea to 12 miles. The League of Nations called such a conference in 1930, and the United Nations has twice convened the maritime states—in 1958 and 1960—for the same purpose. These efforts all failed, primarily because of the insistence by the United States and the United Kingdom, upon maintaining the traditional 3-mile limit. In 1960, in an effort to compromise the positions of the contending states, the United States agreed to accept a 6-mile territorial limit and a 12-mile fisheries limit. This was also unsuccessful.
In the absence of an international agreement, the traditional 3-mile limit has been expanded unilaterally, until now only 30 states adhere to this limit, while 39 claim 12 miles and 32 other states claim varying distances, many of them up to 200 miles.
At the 1960 conference of maritime states, the United States failed by only one vote to convince the necessary number of states that the territorial limit should be six miles. Accordingly, there is no doubt that a 12-mile limit would have been adopted at that conference. Whether this situation still exists after ten years is open to question.
While the offer of the United States to accept a 12-mile limit appears to be a radical change in its position, an examination of its recent diplomatic and security practices shows that this is really not so. Indeed, it may be argued that the United States has already accepted a 12-mile limit as a customary rule of international maritime law.
In 1966, the United States adopted an exclusive fishery zone, 12 miles wide. This zone in the past was always considered a part of the territorial sea. Furthermore, the concept of a contiguous zone has now been generally accepted by all maritime states for the enforcement of health, customs, immigration, and fiscal laws. This zone also is 12 miles in width. Indeed, the only aspect of the territorial sea now limited to three miles is the theoretical privilege of a vessel of war to come within three miles of an alien shore. Except for the isolated instance of Quemoy, however, it is apparent that the commanding officers of American naval vessels have been ordered not to approach within 12 miles of any unfriendly shore. This was particularly evident in the Pueblo case.
North Korea, in common with most Communist states, has claimed jurisdiction over a 12-mile territorial sea. When the Pueblo was sent on her mission, her commanding officer was specifically ordered not to approach closer than 13 miles to the shores of North Korea. This prohibition was placed upon the commanding officer because of the terms of the 1953 armistice agreement, requiring both parties to respect the waters contiguous to Korea, which were understood at that time to extend 12 miles to sea. When the United States signed an acknowledgement of guilt to obtain the release of the crew of the Pueblo, one of the phrases included was the assurance that “. . . no U. S. ships will intrude again in the future into the territorial waters of the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea.” Although this agreement was executed under duress and was repudiated immediately thereafter, it was, nevertheless, a formal admission that the territorial waters of Korea were 12 miles.
The real problem, of course, is not the extension of the territorial waters from three miles to 12 miles, but the effective control over gross claims to waters, as far as 200 miles, which have become common in Central and South American states. Six states—Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, and Brazil—claim a 200-mile zone. The effect of these extreme claims has caused Peru to become statistically the largest producer of fish tonnage in the world, far exceeding even Japan. To enforce this extreme range of the exlusive [sic] fishery zone, the Peruvian Navy customarily seizes foreign fishing vessels, levies large fines against the owners and the captain, and confiscates the cargo. In the last ten years, more than 70 American fishing vessels have been seized under these circumstances. There has been no indication that these states will voluntarily agree to withdraw to a uniform 12-mile limit unless the international community enforces the limit through the use of naval power, an intention which is not apparent at this time.
Another problem is the tendency of states to assert sovereignty over the marginal sea more nearly like that to which internal waters are subject, even to the extent that the right of innocent passage is abridged. Such assertion of sovereignty by Canada was apparent during the first voyage of the SS Manhattan through the Arctic to Alaska from the East Coast of the United States.
Because of these unfortunate devolutions since the failure of the 1960 conference, there is no way to predict the results of the next attempt to pass a new United Nations international territorial waters treaty.
“For the Reserves: A Workable System”
(See H. C. Boschen, Jr., p. 93, April 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Warrant Officer Ronald W. Russell, U. S. Naval Reserve—Commander Boschen’s proposal regarding the use of decommissioned amphibious ships is an excellent idea, for at least two reasons in addition to those he suggested.
First, the desirability of Naval Reservists performing their weekly or monthly drills on board a ship rather than a training center cannot possibly be overemphasized. The lack of interest which the drab buildings and obsolete (or often non-existent) equipment of the training center hold for the enlisted Reservist has perennially been a primary retention problem.
Countless petty officers have failed to re-enlist, giving the absence of shipboard training and the dullness of the training center as major factors. It is particularly ironic that many units in this predicament are located at or near a body of water, which would easily accommodate some type of ship now occupying dock space in the “mothball” fleet.
Secondly, it costs money to operate a training center, it costs money to maintain a mothballed ship. It also costs money when a trained petty officer leaves the Service. All of these expenses can be reduced by implementing Commander Boschen’s plan.
“The Naval Medical Officer: The Worst of Both Worlds”
(See F. E. Dully, Jr., pp. 60-66, January; pp. 101-104, June; pp. 97-99, July; and pp. 100-101, August 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Ransom J. Arthur, Medical Corps, U, S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Navy Medical Neuropsychiatric Research Unit, San Diego—In some comments on Dr. Dully’s article, it is implied or stated that civilian medical institutions are headed primarily by nonphysicians. While it is certainly true that a very large number of small hospitals in America do have lay administrators, it should be noted that the great hospitals and medical centers of the United States have physicians as their chief administrative officers.
Those hospitals, such as the Massachusetts General, the Childrens Medical Center, Boston, the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center, or the Stanford Medical Center, which are leaders in medicine in the areas of innovative patient care, medical teaching, and biomedical research, are all headed by physicians. These prestigious institutions believe that the individual who exercises leadership should have a broad technical education and experience as well as administrative capabilities. So many policy decisions at medical centers involve questions which impinge upon technical matters that it is considered obligatory for the person making the final decision to have some detailed knowledge of at least the general principles involved. For example, decisions made about new research laboratories, more operating rooms, and the need for cobalt therapy machines, call for more than medical advice: they require medical decision. This type of decision is intimately connected with medical responsibility, and ultimately, with the life and death responsibility of patient care.
The splendid record of such military institutions as the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, where superb care has been given to all patients from seamen to presidents, where thousands of physicians and allied medical personnel have been trained, and where many research advances have been made, speak in part to the wisdom of having a commanding officer with a knowledge of medicine, both broad and deep, derived from years of training and experience. This technical background then complements and enriches the commanding officer’s mastery of administrative science.
“After Vietnam”
(See R. E. Williams, Jr., pp. 18-25, April 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Dale Tapp—The author correctly notes the folly of McNamara’s “gradualism” as a basic mistake of the Vietnam war, but makes no mention of two other equally disastrous blunders; viz., (1) the failure to commit American combat forces in 1961 and 1962 to prevent enemy seizure of the Ho Chi Minh trail, and (2) the failure, when troops were belatedly committed, to place all armed forces in South Vietnam under the de facto command of the United States as had been done in the Korean War.
If Southeast Asia was worth fighting for, 1961 and 1962 was the time to do so, while the scale of conflict was still small. And American control of all combat forces would have prevented the endless graft, lethargy, and inefficiency that has plagued all of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) efforts, and so badly undercut our own achievements. Even allowing for the foolish “gradualism” restraints, 75,000 to 100,000 U. S. troops plus ARVN forces under U. S. command could have stopped the Viet Cong in its tracks in the early 1960s, thereby accomplishing at a fraction of the cost far more than a massive later effort. In all probability (virtual certainty without gradualism), had such a course been followed, the war would long since have been won or reduced to minuscule scale.
As to the article’s major theme, I heartily concur that both offensive and defensive missiles be deployed outside Continental United States to the maximum extent feasible, but do not feel that this warrants scrapping our bomber fleet or completely dismantling our ICBM silos. Notwithstanding the extraordinary success of the Polaris missile system, prudence precludes placing all our eggs in one basket, even if SSBNs were as invulnerable as claimed. In point of fact, the Soviets are bending every effort to neutralize this system, and have already made crude attempts at continuous stalking of SSBNs by nuclear-powered attack submarines.
It appears most unwise to stake everything on any single weapons system or any single strategic concept, regardless of apparent merit. Accordingly, I strongly favor keeping all options open to prevent the strategic rigidity (and possible disaster) that necessarily must attend Captain Williams’ viewpoint.
“R.A.F., The Impossible Dream”
(See N. W. Emmott, pp. 26-39, December 1969; and pp. 107-109, July 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Rear Admiral G. C. Leslie, Royal Navy—Throughout the article, there is hardly a mention of the Fighter Command and its great achievements. Yet, the author states that the original impulse for the formation of the R.A.F. was to provide adequate air defense of the homeland. How well the R.A.F. achieved this aim in the Battle of Britain in 1940 and for the rest of the war is so well-known that the author perhaps did not feel the need to mention it. Without this central victory, however, all else might have been lost. It is doubtful if this victory could have been achieved if the Royal Air Force had not been created as a separate service.
“The Development of Navy Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems”
(See D. A. Paolucci, pp. 204-223, May 1970 PROCEEDINGS, NAVAL REVIEW ISSUE)
Lieutenant Commander Richard A. Petrofsky, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—As a former Regulus II flight test Project Officer at Naval Missile Center, Point Mugu, I wish to correct the caption on page 214, which stated, “The only launching by a ship of a Regulus II missile was from the USS Grayback (SSG-574) on 16 September 1958.”
One other Regulus II missile launch was made from the USS King County (AG-157) during the flight test program. The King County was a modified landing ship, tank (LST) containing a mock-up submarine hull, built into the deck well, complete with Regulus II launching capability. The ship was configured for flight test support and never intended for operational use. I do not remember the exact date of the launch, but I believe it preceded the Grayback launch by several weeks.
“What Shall We Wear?”
(See R. H. Schulze, pp. 116-117, December 1969; and p. 95, April 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Ensign Dennis J. McAuley, Civil Engineers Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve—I agree with Commander Schulze when he writes “. . . that we should continue to search for some reasonable alternatives to present uniforms.” I disagree, however, with his suggested “reasonable alternatives.” Personally, I favor eliminating the service dress blue uniform and wearing an appropriate weight service dress khaki uniform year round.
What is really needed is an end to the tinkering that is being done with the uniform. Instead, a careful rethinking of the total uniform needs of today’s naval officer is called for. Such a rethinking would show that an officer should need only two or, at the most, three categories of uniform, viz. a field or rough work uniform, an office or business suit uniform, and, possibly, a ceremonial uniform. Such rethinking would also show that the distinction between winter and summer uniforms should be abolished. An officer should make an individual judgment as to what uniform is appropriate, weatherwise, at any given time and place. This would be the most reasonable procedure to follow if each category of uniform contained, as it should, a range of options (e.g. jackets, gloves, liners, and the like) to make a particular uniform suitable for wear in all except extreme climates.
Most of the unnecessary confusion and extra expense associated with our uniforms would seem to be caused by the existence of more than one type of uniform within each category. For example, in the office wear or business suit category, there are at least three basic, distinctive types—tropical white long, service dress khaki, and service dress blue—where there should only be one. Adding to the confusion are the various specialized permutations (e.g., tropical white short) of the different types of uniforms and those uniforms—such as tropical khaki long—which can be considered, depending on the circumstances, to belong to more than one category.
Our uniform situation very definitely needs to be rationalized and, more importantly, simplified in accordance with some consistent philosophy.
“A Black Shoe in a Brown Shoe World”
(See A. G. Nelson, pp. 57-59, July 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander R. L. Ringbausen, Supply Corps, U, S. Navy—You let the “fresh air” enter the ponderous, pontifical PROCEEDINGS with Captain Nelson’s article. Thank you and please do it again—soon.
“The Navy and the Merchant Marine: Critical Coalition”
(See J. W. Aber, Jr., and P. W. Garber, pp. 40-44, March 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Steven Lazarus, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy, Director of Policy Plans, U. S, Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration—Commanders Aber and Garber made two flat statements:
. . . The Maritime Administration has given no substantive attention to the serious problem of co-ordinated civil and military defense efforts with respect to merchant vessels . . . .
. . . The Maritime Administration, however, has never participated in any U. S. or NATO shipping control exercise and there is no evidence that it has recognized its mobilization responsibilities in any way . . . .
The Maritime Administration (MarAd) is fully cognizant of the need for coordinated civil and military defense efforts with respect to merchant shipping. Employees from the Maritime Administration main headquarters, regional headquarters, and port offices participated in the conduct of NATO exercise Silk Sail, a Navy Control of Shipping Command Post exercise held in October 1969. Representatives of MarAd’s Eastern region headquarters participated in a similar exercise sponsored by Commander Eastern Sea Frontier in February 1970. Personnel of MarAd’s Pacific region office have participated in Antisubmarine Warfare Forces, Pacific (ASWForPac) routing exercises for years, and in April 1967, Vice Admiral John L. Chew, U. S. Navy, then ComASWForPac commended the MarAd Pacific regional director in a letter which said in part:
. . . we derived valuable benefits from MarAd participation in Exercise Sea Rose . . . .The continuing effective cooperation which ASWForPac has received from MarAdPac under your direction provides a welcome feeling of assurance to all of us here concerned with keeping the Pacific sea lanes safely open for support of our national objectives . . .
MarAd continued to participate in exercises in May and July, and those set for October 1970.
MarAd maintains, in Washington, a full-time military plans officer who is also a permanent member of the NATO Shipping Working Group, chaired by the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic. Personnel of the Pacific office have, for many years, provided briefings for military students in the Commander Western Sea Frontier course in Advanced Navy Control of Shipping.
An excellent working relationship between the Naval Control of Shipping organization in the Pacific Ocean area and the Maritime Administration has developed and has been maintained during the Vietnam sea-lift.
The Maritime Administrator serves as Joint Chairman of the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS),* the NATO agency charged with emergency allocation of shipping in a wartime situation. A sizable amount of time and energy is devoted to this effort and on 14-17 April 1970, the 22nd Plenary Session of this body was held in Washington, D.C., with representatives of 13 NATO nations and five NATO military commands in attendance. In May 1969, this organization played a significant role in a major NATO exercise, CivLog-69, which included aspects of NATO shipping control. Numerous MarAd personnel were involved.
*See R. J. Barrett, “NATO’s Planning Board for Ocean Shipping,” U. S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS, April 1970, pp. 124-125.
The President’s new maritime program clearly recognizes the strategic value of the U. S. merchant marine and has been strongly endorsed by the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of the Navy. Planning and ship design personnel of the Maritime Administration are in close and frequent contact with sealift planners in the offices of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Surely, Commanders Aber and Garber must be aware that section 501(b) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 requires review of plans of new ships by the Navy Department and approval by the Secretary of the Navy before construction differential subsidy may be granted.
Electronic data processing has been employed in NATO Naval Control of Shipping Command Post exercises since 1966. A PBOS working group is currently studying its application in detail. Detailed emergency port operating plans have been developed. As a by-product of the Integrated Sealift Study, a ships’ information system which maintains updated characteristics of merchant ships has been developed co-operatively by the Navy, MarAd, and the Department of Transportation.
Much work needs to be done, but such work is being prosecuted aggressively. The cognizant Congressional Committees have been kept thoroughly informed, particularly during the recent period of maritime program hearings. Should the authors of the article wish to examine the issue in greater depth, the Maritime Administration would welcome the opportunity to assist them as it would have welcomed such an opportunity during the preparation of the article. The allegation of inactivity and complacency was most unfortunate and thoroughly unwarranted.