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Like most of the East European navies, the Romanian Navy does not play a significant role in the naval balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But if there is a coalition war in Europe, the Romanian Navy could play a significant role in the Black Sea.
The Romanian Navy consists of more than 90 seagoing surface combatants, including one modern diesel-electric submarine, one large missile destroyer, four small trigates, seven corvettes, two minelayers, and more than 60 small combatants. Most large surface combatants were built domestically during the past decade. But despite this rather large investment of scarce resources, the Romanian Navy remains an unbalanced force. The new destroyer, frigates, and auxiliaries are clearly too large to defend the coastal waters, as stipulated by the nation’s current defense doctrine. It is hard to see how the Romanian Navy could be used anywhere besides the Black Sea in any European conflict. The navy’s coastal antisubmarine warfare capabilities are inadequate. While the navy seems to have a capable mine warfare component, the mine countermeasures force is antiquated. Amphibious lift capabilities are, for practical purposes, nonexistent.
Perhaps the navy’s greatest deficiencies are the quality of its combat training and the morale of its personnel, especially the officer corps. Both of these weaknesses cast doubts on whether the navy could carry out its assigned missions in wartime. Nevertheless, the Romanian Navy has come a long way from its beginnings in the aftermath of the country’s defeat as an ally of Nazi Germany in August 1944.
History: The current Romanian Navy was born on 12 September 1944, when the armistice between the Allies and Romania was signed. The Romanian ground forces, consisting of 12 infantry divisions, the air force, and the navy, were organized from the remnants of the army that had fought on Germany’s side and were put under the command of the Soviet 2d Ukrainian Front.
By the end of the war, the Romanian Navy consisted of the Danube River Flotilla and the Coastal Defense Force.1 Operationally, the navy was controlled by the General Staff, and by August 1945 the first Soviet naval advisers were attached to all major commands in the Romanian Navy.2 The Paris Peace Treaty, signed in February 1947, limited the Romanian armed forces to 148,000 men and 150 aircraft; the navy was allowed no more than 5,000 men in active service.3 Soviet-style uniforms, ranks, and technical and tactical manuals were adopted by the Romanian armed forces.
By mid-1947. the Royal Romanian Navy consisted of
4,500 men, two 620-650-ton submarines, four 1.850-ton destroyers, one Romanian-built 812-ton minelayer, three minesweepers, two 258-ton torpedo craft and four captured ex-German S-boats, one 2,300-ton Italian-built submarine depot ship, one 1,604-ton German-built sail-training ship, and two former royal yachts. Three ex-Austro-Hungarian monitors and 18 ex-Soviet river patrol craft served on the Danube River.4
After the monarchy was abolished in December 1947, Romania became one of the most repressive communist- ruled countries. The Romanian armed forces strove to become what the Soviets called a “socialist type” army. In 1948-49 about 300 Romanian officers, including some naval officers, were sent to the Soviet Union to complete their basic and higher professional educations. The process of emulating the Soviet Army was completed by the mid- 1950s.5
By 1948, the navy had 120 ships and craft, 20 of which were inoperable.6 Romania did not build any ships domestically until 1953-54, at which time it built two 450-ton Soviet-designed tugs. By then, the first of eight 40-ton river patrol craft were constructed at the Galati shipyard. The navy received its first relatively modern surface combatants in 1955, when eight P-4-class torpedo craft were transferred from the Soviet Union.
By 1957, the Soviets had transferred three 330-ton Kronshtadt-class submarine chasers and 22 145-ton T-301-class inshore minesweepers. In the late 1950s, eight Polish-designed TR-40 minesweeping boats were built in Romanian yards. Six Osa-I-class missile craft were acquired from the Soviets in the early 1960s.
The Romanian Navy went through a difficult time in the mid- and late-1960s. Money was scarce; many aged ships and craft were stricken and no ships or craft were built locally or transferred from the Soviet Union. Both Romanian-built submarines were scrapped in 1967. Also deleted from the list were the four remaining destroyers and the only minelayer.
In 1970, the Romanian Navy acquired three Soviet-built 400-ton Poti-class ASW corvettes. Three 1,300-ton Romanian-built coastal tankers were completed in 1971.
The navy entered a more promising phase of its postwar development after 1972, when the armed forces were reorganized and a new national defense concept was adopted. The navy began to modernize its seagoing and riverine combat craft in 1973, and obtained licenses to build a large number of Chinese-designed combat craft. The Man- galia shipyard delivered the first of about two dozen 135- ton Shanghai-II-class patrol craft in 1973, and the Dobreta Shipyard in Turnu completed the first of about 24 Chi-
Squired an undisclosed number of advanced Soviet-built K.a-2 Helix-A ASW elos- the first such helos to be acquired
y any European non-Warsaw Pact navy.23
The Naval Border Brigade apparently as been dissolved, probably in the late 70s. Several Naval Border Detach- rnents were organized in its stead. These Units form an integral part of the Yugo- s av Frontier Troops, which are controlled by the Frontier Troops Directorate of the General Staff. The detachments are responsible for preventing violations of the country’s maritime borders and for patrolling the lakes and rivers that Yugoslavia shares with its neighbors. They also aid the police, customs, and medical services; help protect fisheries; and assist in sea search and rescue.24
The seagoing force of border patrol craft consists of 11 120-ton Mima-class
(Type-240) and seven older 85-ton Type- 131-class craft. The Mimas were built in this decade to replace the Type-13Is. The newest class of seagoing border patrol craft is the 80-ton Type-80. A scaled- down version of the Mima-class, these also are offered for export. An unknown number of the 55-ton Type-20 craft have coastal and riverine patrolling duties. At least six 23-ton Type-16 and probably as many as a dozen of the 20-ton Type-15
By Milan Vego
nes>e-designed, 45-ton, Huchuan-class hydrofoil torpedo ft ln 1973-74; three more Huchuans were transferred y’m China. The first of 18 domestically designed 85-ton -76-class armored river craft was completed in Dulcea “ttipyard in 1973. By 1975, the first of 20 65-ton VD-class river minesweepers was completed in Turnu- ievenn shipyard.
The most important phase in the development of the 0rnanian Navy began in 1980. During the following few V ars, one destroyer, four small frigates, 12 or more tor- R ) ° CIa*1, ant' several large auxiliary vessels were built in ernania. The first submarine to enter service in 20 years, tesel-powered Kilo class, was acquired from the Sovi- ts ln December 1986.
his buildup, however, occurred during severe eco- °nnc difficulties. Moreover, most of the ships built were 00 'arSe to have any real value for the navy’s wartime rssions as envisaged by the country’s national defense °°ncept—probably the result of the megalomaniacal pre- nsions of President Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime in Bu-
charest. Since 1986, no new ships or craft have been built.
Organization: The Romanian armed forces consist of the regular army and many paramilitary forces and organizations, of which the Patriotic Guards are the most numerous. The Ministry of National Defense in Bucharest controls all the services of the regular armed forces.
The navy is controlled administratively by the Chief of Central Directorate for Naval Forces, which is subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense.7 The General Staff and the High Political Council of the Army are integral parts of the ministry. In the operational chain of command, the navy is controlled by the General Staff through the navy section, which is headed by a navy captain.
The commander-in-chief (CinC) of the navy is a two- star admiral headquartered in Constanta. The chief of staff is also a two-star admiral. Directly subordinate to the navy’s CinC are several deputies, including the deputies for political affairs, combat training, and coastal defense. The major navy commands are:
► The Black Sea Fleet (Mangalia)
► The Coastal Defense Force (Constanta)
► Naval Aviation (Constanta)
► The Danube Military Flotilla (Giurgiu)
► The naval educational and training establishment (Mangalia)
The navy has a number of support services, including naval engineering, construction, transportation, medical, and hydrographic. Also subordinate to the navy is one naval infantry battalion.8
Personnel: The strength of the Romanian Navy is estimated to be about 10,000 men. About 66% are career officers, warrant officers, and petty officers.9 About 95% of all officers are graduates of higher professional schools, while about 30% have completed the Military Academy in Bucharest.10 The officer ranks are similar to those in the Soviet Navy.
Political control in the navy, as throughout the Romanian armed forces, is pervasive and strictly enforced. About 90% of the naval officers are Communist Party members; the rest belong to the communist youth organization.
About 75% of the warrant officers and 60% of the petty officers are party members.11
The Higher Political Council of the Army is in charge of political officer appointments, from the highest com-
Romania’s navy depends greatly on its four Tetal-class small frigates, each of which has a helo platform. Tetal 261 entered service in 1983. Economic problems hindered the class’s construction.
craft patrol the lakes and rivers.25
Reports in the West stated that the Yugoslavs have purchased a number of Swedish RBS-15 antiship missiles to replace Soviet-supplied SSC-3s in the armament of coastal missile batteries.26 But it is more likely that the RBS-15s would supplement, rather than replace, the SSC-3s, which are relatively recent acquisitions.
Albania: Most of the ships and craft in the Albanian Navy are in bad material condition. The number of active surface ships continues to decline because of their advanced age and lack of spare parts. The two aging Whiskey-class submarines are still listed, but are probably inoperable, as are the six Shanghai-II- class patrol craft. Only one T-43-class ocean minesweeper remains in service. Thus, the navy’s mine warfare capability rests on the remaining four very old
T-301 -class inshore minesweepers. None of the PO-2-class minesweeping boats are in service. And only one Khobi-class support tanker and one Toplivo-class yard tanker are reported to remain in service." 'Wehrtechnik, October 1988, p. 86.
2A. D. Baker III, U. S. ed., Combat Fleets of The World 1988/89 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 168.
mands to the ship squadron level. Political officers work closely with the civilian party committees; navy political activities are heavily influenced by the local party committees in which the command of a unit is located. The loyalty of the navy’s rank and file is ensured by pervasive secret police control; secret police informers are found in each unit at all levels. In contrast to the other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies, however, the Romanian secret police are supervised by party watchdogs at every level.12
Education: The navy's educational and training establishment is small. Basic professional training for unrestricted line officers and naval engineers is provided by the Mircea cel Batrin Higher Naval School in Constanta. Candidates for this four-year school are selected from the graduates of civilian high schools and petty officer schools. Midshipmen graduate with the rank of lieutenant.13 Unlike other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact navies, since 1964 Romanian naval officers have not been sent to the Soviet Union to complete their higher professional training.14 Officers selected for high command posts are sent to the Military Academy in Bucharest. This institution was formed in 1957-59 when four military academies were merged into one. It provides the basic professional education for officers of all specialties in all of the nation’s military services. Political officers are trained with their counterparts in other services at the party school run by the Higher Political Council of the Army. Secretaries of political councils and party committees complete their higher political education at the Military Academy in Bucharest.
Petty officers and warrant officers are trained in two- and three-year schools, respectively. Navy draftees are called into service at the age of 18, or 20 if they are high school graduates. Draftees on sea duty serve 24 months, while those assigned to shore duty serve 16 months.15 Sailors may voluntarily extend their active service. Sailor basic training and warrant officer school are conducted at Mangalia. Only the most capable and—more important— the most politically trustworthy sailors are selected to complete the petty officer school.
Training: Naval combat training consists of two one- year cycles. Reportedly, tactical, special, and command- staff exercises have an important role, but infantry tactics consume a substantial part of combat training.16 When the Romanian Navy became part of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command in 1956, ideological training increased.17 Today, this intensive political education and indoctrination, which emphasizes Marxism-Leninism, consumes much of the navy’s precious training time. More than in any other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact navy. Romanian Navy training is intended to enhance national and political awareness among the rank and file. To illustrate, about 28-30% of the time assigned for training in the Romanian Ground Forces is devoted to political education and indoctrination, only 23-25% concerns tactical training.18
Further, many navy draftees are used in purely civilian roles such as harvesting, building canals and irrigation systems, and other construction work. Sailors who volunteer for this work receive double their annual leave.
Warsaw Pact Cooperation: Romania generally participates routinely in most political and military activities of the Warsaw Pact. Since 1963, however, Romania has prohibited the use of its territory for any joint Warsaw Pact exercise, and it has been reported that Romanian ground and naval forces have not participated in a large-scale Warsaw Pact exercise since 1967. A contingent of Romanian troops did participate in a large 1970 joint exercise in East Germany. In recent years, the Romanian Navy probably took part in only two small joint naval exercises, one in 1967 and another held in the Black Sea area in 1972.
Despite the evident lack of Romanian interest in joint naval exercises, links between the Romanian Navy and other Warsaw Pact navies in the Black Sea are relatively strong. Almost all new ships and craft are fitted with Soviet-designed sensors, weapons, and equipment, so the navy depends greatly on Soviet goodwill for spare parts. Cooperation between the Romanian Navy and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, especially regarding political education and indoctrination, is relatively free from the ups and downs in diplomatic relations between Bucharest and Moscow. Exchanges of political officers, party committees, and youth organizations are conducted routinely among all Warsaw Pact navies. The Romanian Navy exchanges regular ship visits with the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the Bulgarian Navy.
Missions: Romania’s geostrategic position greatly influences its navy’s wartime missions. The Romanian Black Sea coast extends 150 miles, and Romania dominates a 44-mile-long estuary of the Danube River. The narrowest point between the Danube and the Black Sea is the stretch of land between Cemavoda and Constanta, which acts as a barrier to north-south movement! A 40-mile Danube River-Black Sea canal has been built between Cemavoda and the new port of Constanta-South, shortening the shipping route by about 350 miles. It also allows Romania full control over all shipping on the Danube River, including that destined for the Soviet port of Izmail. About 1.500 miles of Romania’s rivers are navigable, including 900 miles of the Danube. The border with Bulgaria on the Danube extends 375 miles.
In contrast to the other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact coun-
Soldo, und Technik, July 1988, p. 382.
Die Hubschraubcr der Reihe Mi-14,” Volksarmee, 4 Apnl 1988, p. 8. ’
6. ™rtechnik, August 1988, p. 71.
ersten we'blichen NVA-Offiziere,” Soldat Technik’ October 1988, p. 637.
Manneforum June [98g p 21g
R Marittima, July 1988, p. 152; Marine aschau, February 1988, p. 12; Soldat und Tech- ?*• Ju|y 1988, p. 422.
, omfcar Fleets, p. 451. n °ln‘en Polski, no. 18, 1988, p. 16. t2L°mbat Fleets, p. 452.
°dm und Technik, July 1988, p. 422.
uCombat Fleets, pp. 455-456.
l4"PoIand to Cut Military, Defense Minister Says,”
The Washington Post, 4 January 1989, p. A15.
x5Soldat und Technik, June 1988, p. 374.
l6“Das ‘Gemeinsame Geschwader,’” Soldat und
Technik, July 1988, p. 432.
,7“Drei Flotten and fuenf Pokale, ” Volksarmee, 11 July 1988, p. 9.
18“Defense Minister Kadijevic Press Interview,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Europe Daily (FB15-EEU-88-245) 21 December 1988,
p. 61.
19Marineforum, June 1986, p. 215.
20Combat Fleets, p. 854.
21 Ibid., p. 855.
22”Avijacijska Brigada Za Podrsku RM,” Vojni Lek- sikon (Belgrade: Vojno Izdavacki Zavod, 1981), p. 44.
23Soldat und Technik, December 1988, p. 789. 24‘‘Granicni Momaricki Odred” (Border Naval Detachment), Ibid., p. 154.
25Combat Fleets, pp. 858-59.
26Ibid., p. 853.
27Ibid., p. 1.
Dr. Vego is Adjunct Professor of East European Studies at the Defense Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency.
Ies’ Romania has not assigned any part of its regular rnied lorces to the joint command of the Warsaw Pact.
e Romanian leaders apparently believe that the only ^ossible threat to the country’s security is from the Soviets ■ rorn a Soviet-let invasion. For this reason, the Roma- ■ans adopted their “Doctrine of War of the Entire Peo- Ro concePt> similar to that adopted by Yugoslavia. The man,an national defense concept is purely defensive,
Force Composition 1988
(1) Black Sea Fleet
1 Kilo-class submarine
* Muntenia-class missile destroyer ^ Tetal-class frigates
3 Poti-class ASW corvettes
4 Democratia-c\ass patrol corvettes 6 Osa-I-class missile craft
21 Shanghai-II-class (4 ASW, 17 patrol)
3 Kronshtadt-class submarine chasers *2 Epitrop-class torpedo craft 3 Huchuan-class torpedo craft (hydrofoil)
2 Cosar-class minelayers
*2 T-301 -class inshore minesweepers
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
26
oceanographic research ship small combatants tenders coastal tankers seagoing rescue tug ocean tugs sailing training ship headquarters ship survey ship service craft
(2) Danube Military Flotilla
1 Brutar-class monitor 18 VB-76-class armored patrol craft ^ VG- 10-class patrol craft 20 VD-41 class minesweepers 3 SD-200 class patrol/utility craft 9 SM-165 class patrol/utility craft * headquarters ship
and thus diametrically opposed to the basic tenets of the Soviets Warsaw Pact doctrine.19
The official wartime missions of the Romanian Navy will be to repulse an “eventual aggressor from across the sea and rivers” in cooperation with air and ground forces. Specifically, the Romanian Navy would be tasked to “annihilate an aggressor at sea,” mine coastal waters, support ground forces in defense of the littoral area, secure the maritime flank of the ground forces, oppose the attacker's landings, disorganize the attacker’s at-sea transport, and secure the country’s own maritime and riverine communications.20 The Romanian Air Force would support the fleet and troops operating on the coast by destroying enemy targets at sea and on the coast.21
'A. V. Antosek et. al., Zarozhdenie Narodnykh Armiy Stran Uchastnits Varshavskogo Dogovora 1941-1949 (Dawn of The People's Armies Of The Countries of The Warsaw Treaty, 1941-49) (Moscow: Nauka Press 1975), p. 218.
2Ibid., p. 220.
3P. A. Zhilin, Stroitel’stvo Armiy Evropeyskikh Stran Solsialisticheskogo Sodruzhestvo 1949-1980 (Organization Of The Annies of The European Countries Of the Socialist Commonwealth. 1949-80) (Moscow: Nauka Press, 1984), p. 207.
4Francis McMurtrie, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 1947-48 (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1947). pp. 256-59.
'A. D. Verbitskiy, Armii stran Varshavskogo Dogovora (Armies of the Warsaw Treaty Countries) (Moscow: Voenizdat. 1974), p. 129.
•Zhilin, pp. 219, 207.
7Verbitskiy, p. 237.
“Ibid., p. 131; Constantin Antonin, Major General, et. al., (eds.), Armata Republicu Socialiste Romdna. Sinleza Sociai-Poliricd Militara (Army of The Socialist Republic Of Romania. A socio-political and military synthesis) (Bucharest: Editura Militara, 1978), p. 135; Friedrich Wiener, Armeen der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten (Munich: J. F. Lehmans, 6th ed., 1974), pp 86-87.
9Ivan Volgyes. The Political Reliability Of The Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier (Durham: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1982), p. 42. '“Verbitskiy, pp. 133-34.
"Ibid., p. 134.
"Volgyes, The Southern Tier, p. 51.
'“Verbitskiy, p. 134.
"Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Influence In Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 208.
‘■'Verbitskiy, pp. 132, 134.
16Ibid., pp. 134-135.
"Zhilin, pp. 207, 219.
'“Zhilin, p. 245. _
"George W. Price, “Nationalism in the Romanian Military: Ceausescu’s Double-Edged Sword” in Jeffrey Simon and Trond Gilbcrg, eds.. Security Implications of Nationalism in East Europe (Bouldcr/New York: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 287-88.
“Antonin, et. al., p. 65; Christopher D. Jones and Theresa Rakowska- Harmstone, eds., Warsaw Pact: The Question Of Cohesion. Phase II: Vol. 2. Poland. German Democratic Republic, and Romania, ORAE-Mural Paper No. 33. (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment. 1984), p. 362.
"Antonin et. al., pp. 134-135.