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The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided-mis- sile frigate today operates in every theater, in every tactical scenario, and in every task group makeup in the scheme of U.S. Navy fleet operations. Two FFGs routinely maintained the farthest north Persian Gulf patrol station during Operation Desert Storm. Oliver Hazard Per^-class frigates were the primary merchant escort for U.S.-flagged tankers in Persian Gulf waters during the Iran-Iraq War. They participated in blockade operations in the Middle East, drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean, long-range antisubmarine warfare operations in the Mediterranean and Norwegian seas, and they served as escorts in carrier and battleship battle groups.
FFGs have also become the cornerstone of the surface component of the U.S. Naval Reserve. Eighteen ships of the class formally serve in reserve training duties in home ports from Philadelphia to San Francisco.
The FFG excels in the generalist application of naval power. Her systems are balanced and surprisingly capable for her size and moderate construction expense. She fits well into the mix of naval missions. The FFG can hold her own in most war-fighting scenarios and in many cases can substitute for more specialized high-tech forces, releasing them for other missions. She provides the glue and the numbers that make the team.
Although the ships are generalists by nature, the FFGs can contribute to a wide range of missions and scenarios. This class also specializes in several specific areas— areas where the FFG can perform as well as or better than any other unit in the U.S. inventory:
^ Sophisticated Long-Range ASW: With the SQS-19 towed array, the SQQ-89 combat system, and the LAMPS III helicopter, the FFG’s capabilities are impressive and state-of-the-art; especially when used in distant singleship screening and barrier stations.
^ Comprehensive Escort Operations: The FFG has been the preferred sealift escort since its introduction because of its reliability, its long-range surveillance potential from embarked helicopters, and its good mix of antiship and antisubmarine weapons and sensors. Its recent successes in the Persian Gulf attest to this.
^ Combat Operations in the Third World: FFGs demonstrated good self-defense capabilities during the Gulf War while undertaking battle group picket assignments, engaging small naval combatants, battling troops on islands and oil platforms, projecting helicopter firepower, and providing battleship and amphibious escort services.
^ Drug Interdiction: With embarked helicopters, FFGs can cover a patrol line more than 200 miles across, around the clock, indefinitely.
^ American Representation Overseas: With worldwide reach and a size that meshes well in multinational exercises, FFGs are uniquely positioned to support international diplomatic initiatives, especially in far corners of the world.
But the seascape is changing rapidly today. One very noticeable product of the new world political and eco- » nomic climate is the decline of the U.S. surface-combatant force structure. With the retirements of entire classes
of destroyers and frigates, the pressure on the remaining ships of the fleet will invariably increase. As the FFG represents the most abundant ship type of those remaining, these changes in operational assignments (and the resulting adjustment in operational tempo) are becoming key considerations for the class.
Planning for the FFG-7 of Tomorrow
A good endurance rule of thumb is that most surface combatants contribute effectively for about 30 years. Beyond that point, a ship needs extensive war-fighting alterations to keep abreast of the threat—modifications that usually require expensive upgrades to ship support systems. With relatively few years remaining in a ship’s life, most navies simply cannot justify such modernizations and retire older ships at about the 30-year point.
Therefore, to be most cost-effective, any major classwide ship modernization program must begin before the class is 10 to 15 years old. This early upgrade will allow enough service life in the ships to reap the benefits of modernization. The average age of FFGs today is just eight years (ranging from a high of 13 to a low of two years old).
Whether the FFG should undertake a significant modernization program and how the class should evolve are valid and important questions. And because of the expense involved in classwide improvements, the answers will impact all fleet modernization decisions during the upcoming decade.
To answer the question of FFG modernization appropriately, two factors weigh heavily: How will the FFG be used during the next 15 years? What opposition will it face? Only then can the Navy decide what priority class modernization should have in future affordability discussions.
How Will the FFG be Used?
The Navy considers all of its surface combatants as either battle force capable (able to sustain escort/support operations for carrier and battleship battle groups) or protection of shipping (designed for a less intense threat environment, protecting shipping while also being available to augment battle group defense). The FFG fits into the protection-of-shipping category.
Although these categories illustrate a pecking order among some ships (Aegis versus non-Aegis ships, for instance), they actually do little to foretell future operational assignments or even to project exposure to hostile action. A better way to predict future uses of the FFG is first to examine how theater commanders and fleet schedulers have used the FFG recently and then, draw straightline, common sense projections.
The Navy is continuing to build on recent successes achieved in the art of ASW, especially involving surface ships. Indeed, for many such missions (those that require long-duration continuous coverage, occur far from established air bases, or require shallow-water or antidiesel ca-
pability) the surface ship is the preferred U.S. Navy ASW asset.
During the next ten years, the fleetwide ASW impact of the FFG will be even more dramatic. The next decade will see the retirement of Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates and ongoing trends that are taking other classes of surface combatants away from ASW. Partially by default, the FFG will become the fleet’s predominant ASW surface combatant just at the time when such warfare remains a pressing mission requirement for the Navy.
Other U.S. combatants will be unable to fill the void. The Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers are excellent ASW platforms but are evolving away from ASW as they realize their new-found, potent Tomahawk missile capability. The Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers focus on the battle group antiair warfare problem, are tethered close to the carrier, and have little flexibility for long-duration ASW prosecutions.
The new Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers have impressive active and passive ASW hardware but no ASW reach, no ability to employ ASW ordnance (except in a nearby defensive role), and no ability to prosecute at long ranges—all because of a critically shortsighted lack of an indigenous helicopter. The DDG- 51 's ASW capability is tied, literally, to the whim of the patrol (P-3) and ASW aircraft (S-3) communities. The DDG-51’s ASW Achilles’ heel can only be protected by the provision of frigates in future ASW plans.
Recent tanker escort missions in the Persian Gulf as well as Desert Storm requirements confirmed the need for an effective, defensible sealift capability. The FFG is an excellent choice for this job. Its relatively long range and flexible combat systems suite match it well against the primary antiair and antisurface warfare threats to commercial shipping.
From top-of-the-line Soviet submarine and carrier operating forces to Third World insurgents and from Iraqi- style petrodollar armed forces to terrorists, the Navy must cope with a surprisingly wide spectrum of evolving threats.
In naval terms, the Soviet Union still ranks as the most sophisticated potential adversary of the United States. High-tech supersonic cruise missiles, formidable shipboard defenses, long-range ballistic missiles, and sophisticated deep-diving submarines cannot be dismissed easily by discussions focused exclusively on economic travail. Maintaining a quantifiable edge over potential adversaries has long been the key to stifling adventurism and to maintaining Western supremacy on the world’s oceans. This theme will not change in the future.
Modern-day military hardware will continue to proliferate in Third World countries, as superpower armed forces shrink over the next decade. This will be the result of excess (but not obsolete) ships, aircraft, and armament being spread abroad at fire-sale prices. This trend will be fueled by many countries that wish to invest their riches in the high-tech superweapons showcased during the Gulf War.
Older navies with ships built in the 1940s and 1950s will soon be able to modernize with ships built in the 1970s and 1980s. High-tech, extended-range small diesel submarines will soon replace subs of earlier generations. Cruise missiles should become more sophisticated and plentiful. Aircraft-delivered ordnance will, too. Chemical and nuclear weapons in the wrong hands could cause swings in individual national capability or could raise the spectre of superpower intimidation by international bullies.
Regional conflicts, religious and ethnic struggles, resurgent nationalism, or acts of unprovoked aggression with the potential to involve U.S. armed forces must not be discounted; neither should the use of limited U.S. sea power to achieve desired diplomatic goals. More than anything else, U.S. naval forces of the next two decades must be flexible and potent—ready to carry out missions from sea control to power projection in scenarios we can only guess at today. After all, who would have predicted that U.S. military power would be used as it was in Panama and Iraq?
The FFG-7 of the Future
The match of future operational assignments with projections of the threat clearly indicates that the guided-mis- sile frigate requires some degree of mid-life improvement if the class is to be a valuable contributor during its expected 30-year service life. Operational assignments will continue to be intense, and the threat will continue to mature and diversify. Upgrade initiatives are available now and in the near future to address many of these areas. As world events unfold, FFGs have the potential to be the
side in long-range force planning.
Technological evaluation needs now to define the most important characteristics and capabilities in a future frigate design—one targeted to replace the FFG-7 in its pro tec - tion-of-shipping role in 15 to 20 years. This effort can begin where the recently terminated “NATO Frigate Replacement” (NFR-90) project, the “Navy-21,” and “Revolution at Sea 2020” technology studies left off.
The NFR-90 project yielded preliminary design plans for a 6,000-ton, twin-screw, combined diesel/gas turbine frigate available today with phased-array radars, missile vertical launcher cells, hull-mounted and towed-array sonars, five-inch and point-defense gunnery systems, and a single helicopter. As such, the projected design did not encompass any revolutionary and few evolutionary improvements over the design characteristics of an FFG- 7. It did, though, give a clear indication of the types of frigate design possible during the 1990s.
Aiming toward an appropriate frigate design for 15 to 20 years in the future is a real advantage. It will allow today’s planner to reject the evolutionary approach inherent in the rather conservative NFR-90 designs and to address the potential for revolutionary changes. This is the most appropriate approach to maintaining the frigate’s value in warfare scenarios. Chief among these may be such design considerations as stealth, small crew size (about 50 people), aircraft/helicopter/unmanned-air-vehi-
preeminent ships for a whole host of challenges and missions in any “new world order.”
The ship's broad multimission capability and large class size all point to the realization of this potential. Intelligent modernizations now will enable the frigate to execute roles in both expected and wholly unexpected scenarios. If any ship today is the perfect “new world order” combatant, it is the Oliver Hazard Perry FFG.
Must the United States design and build a new generation of frigates to follow the Oliver Hazard Perry class? We may be thankful that the answer is, no. The relative youth of the class and its successful and flexible construction preclude the need for an immediate follow-on class. But a frigate is too successful a design, too affordable a system, too attractive a package to fall by the way- cle operating capability, antitorpedo and antimissile defense, better command-and-control components, and a broad multimission capability with a particular emphasis on a specific war-fighting speciality (such as ASW).
The Bridge to Tomorrow
The Oliver Hazard Perry class today is no square peg in a round hole. Since their introduction, these ships have
FFG-7: Smaller Is Better
By Captain John J. Kieley III, U.S. Navy (Retired)
For the many difficult tactical situations that may present themselves in the low-intensity conflicts that are envisaged for the future, the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates are much better suited than the Ticon- deroga (CG-47)-class guided missile cruisers.
The Ticonderoga-class and its Aegis system were designed primarily for one job—protecting aircraft carrier battle groups against high-density raids from a sophisticated threat. In performing this task, the Ticonderoga- class is second to none, but, in many others, they are just too much warship for the job.
First, there is cost. The Navy must be smart about the budget dollar if it is to maintain a capable fleet. In 1986 dollars, a Perry- class frigate cost approximately $400 million to build and fit out; a Ticonderoga-class cruiser cost over $1 billion. A Perry-class
frigate has a total complement of 206 to a Ticonderoga-class cruiser's 364 officers and crew.
The capabilities of a Perry- class frigate, especially the later versions, for working in low-intensity conflicts are impressive.
Its two embarked helicopters— SH-60 LAMPS III—have longer range than their predecessors, longer on-station time (four hours), and sensor and weapon systems that are extremely effective in antisurface warfare as well as ASW. The Perry-class frigates' high speed and exceptional maneuverability—because of their bow thrusters and gas turbine propulsion—make them invaluable for operations in shallow and confined waters, where brush-fire wars will be fought.
There are other advantages to the Perry-class besides reduced manpower costs and excellent capabilities. In any crisis situation, restraint can prevent an accident
or some trivial incident from leading to a full-blown shooting match. The large number of people in the command-and-control loop coupled with the automatic nature of the Aegis system could easily lead to another tragedy like the 1988 destruction of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes (CG-49), or worse. The captain of a Perry-class frigate standing behind an operations specialist in the ship's combat information center can see the raw video display and, so, has a more immediate grasp of the total situation.
The captain of a Ticonderoga- class cruiser may receive too much information and must take the word of the people who are giving him that information and, therefore, may feel compelled to “shoot first and ask questions later.”
Captain Kieley was the commissioning captain of the USS Reuben James (FFG-57).
matured into a valid, broadly based portion of the U.S. fleet. Words such as “mainstay” and “indispensable” may apply, as well.
FFGs have earned their status. They are rugged (with such vivid survivability examples as the Stark [FFG-31] and Samuel B. Roberts [FFG-58] fresh in our minds), wide ranging (proved in operations from the Arctic Circle to the Gulf War) and versatile (from independent patrols to battle group support). They employ state-of-the-art technology in many mission areas and are the fleet commander’s choice to carry out many current day-to-day assignments.
The FFG cannot substitute for a battle force combatant as represented by Ticonderoga cruisers or Arleigh Burke destroyers. The FFG’s design requirements and inherent size limitations restrict sustainability, equipment redundancy, and the ability to control the tactical situation in an advanced multithreat environment. What the class can do, though, is to augment existing battle groups in this era of reduced fleet size. Fleet requirement will undoubtedly not decrease as rapidly as fleet size over the next decade, and FFGs are more operationally affordable than the larger combatants.
Properly modernized today, the FFG also will serve as a necessary and capable bridge to the future. The FFG is a class already bought and paid for. We must not underemphasize this class’s contributions or forget where it fits into the master picture, in spite of all the hoopla associated with the latest Aegis building program.
In the foreseeable future, the FFG will carry the flame and will be the ship that fleet commanders worldwide can depend on. The challenge for this decade has changed from one of simply finding a niche for this stalwart ship to one of actively keeping the class employed and modernized, now that it has found that niche.
Commander Linder currently is attached to the staff of Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. He commanded the USS Elrod (FFG- 55) from 1989 to 1991.